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1

JURISDICTION OP APPELLATE COURT
This is an appeal and cross-appeal from a final judgment
entered on January 14, 1993 by the Honorable Michael R. Murphy.
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE
ANN, §78-2a-3(2)(k) (1993).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues before this Court involve the initial appeal by
BURNINGHAM & KIMBALL, CHRISTENSEN & KIMBALL, VICTOR M. KIMBALL
and SPECTRUM DEVELOPMENT (hereinafter collectively referred to as
"KIMBALL") and the cross-appeal by FARRELL G. and VICKI A.
FORSBERG (hereinafter "FORSBERGS").

The issues raised by the

appeal and cross-appeal are:
1.

Whether the Trial Court's factual finding regarding

negligent misrepresentation are supported by the evidence.
2.

Whether there is an implied warranty of habitability in

the state of Utah.
3.

Whether the Trial Court erroneously adopted and applied

a restrictive interpretation of the scope of the implied warranty
of habitability.
4.

Whether the Trial Court improperly found that the

express one-year builders' warranty contained in the Earnest
Money Sales Agreement had been waived.
The first issue involves the Trial Court's finding of fact.
The next two issues involve conclusions of law, and the Trial

1

Court's factual findings on those issues are not in question on
this appeal.

The final issue involves the Trial Court's legal

conclusion based on facts that were presented to it, but on which
the Trial Court did not make specific findings of fact.
STANDARD OP REVIEW
The Court should give all defence and reasonable inference
to all findings of fact made by the trial court following a
plenary trial.

The Court should review for correctness those

conclusions of law reached by the trial court.

Utah State

Coalition of Senior Citizens v. Utah Power & Light Co., 776 P.2d
632, 634 (Utah 1989); English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154, 1156
, ^ ,
DETERMINATIVE LAW
%
(Utah App. 1989).

(N0NE)

STATEMENT OP THE CASE
The only factual findings in issue on appeal relate to the
finding of negligent misrepresentation.

On cross-appeal facts

concerning the Earnest Money Sales Agreement are reviewed.
Therefore, only facts relevant to these issues are presented
here.

All other issues on appeal involve conclusions of law.
1.

KIMBALL purchased approximately 20 lots in the

Benchmark subdivision in 1985, or 1986.
2.

(R. 2048)

To help facilitate the sale of the lots, KIMBALL

decided to build a home on one of the "more difficult lots."
2051)

2

(R.

3.

During the construction of the home, dirt from the

excavation of the footings was moved to the back of the property
which covered some survey stakes marking the back corners of the
lot.

(R. 2099)
4.

After the survey stakes were covered, but before

FORSBERGS first saw the home, KIMBALL had poplar trees planted
between the home and the GMAC building (a business down the hill
to the west).

The trees were planted without regard to the

actual boundaries of the property.
5.

(R. 2101)

Once the home was completed, KIMBALL placed a

large banner along the back porch, facing west, which read "For
Sale."

(R. 1698)
6.

KIMBALL left a "FACT SHEET" on a counter in the

home with the intent that prospective buyers would read it.

(R.

2096)
7.

The FACT SHEET contained information regarding

certain qualities and elements of the home including a statement
that the yard was "98' x 102', flat backyard with room for a
pool."

(Appendix 1)
8.

A realtor, hired by KIMBALL, had prepared the FACT

SHEET for use while the realtor listed the home.
9.

(R. 2 093)

When the listing contract between the realtor and

KIMBALL expired, KIMBALL

blocked out the name of the real estate

company and continued to use the same FACT SHEET.

3

In addition to

removing the name of the realtor, KIMBALL specifically removed
the statement at the bottom of the FACT SHEET warning "Reliable
but not guaranteed information."
10.

(R. 2093, 2095)

When FORSBERGS first entered the home, they found

a stack of fact sheets on the kitchen counter.

They picked one

up and read it as they walked through the home.

(R. 1702-03)

11.

Upon reading from the FACT SHEET that the yard was

98' x 102' with room for a pool, FORSBERGS were impressed that it
was a spacious backyard. (R. 1710, 1712)
12.

FORSBERGS' next visit to the house was with

KIMBALL. (R. 1713)
13.

With no survey stakes to mark the back property

line, FORSBERGS were having difficulty visualizing how big this
"98' x 102', flat backyard" really was.
about the size of the yard.

FORSBERGS asked KIMBALL

In confirming where the back

boundaries were, KIMBALL assured FORSBERGS that the poplar trees
were "within the property line."
14.

(R. 1718)

Before closing, FORSBERGS and KIMBALL signed an

Earnest Money Sales Agreement in which KIMBALL gave an express
"one-year builders' warranty."

(Appendix 2 p. 4, para.No. 6) or

(Earnest Money Sales Agreement p. 4, para.No. 6)
15.

Later, several months after closing, FORSBERGS

discovered that the poplar trees were not "within the property,"

but were up to fourteen feet beyond the property boundary.

(R.

1804)
16.

After the trial, but before the Trial Court

rendered its decision, KIMBALL filed a supplemental brief
outlining their position regarding the "one-year builders'
warranty11 contained in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement.
KIMBALL argued that Clause "B" and "O" both operated to make the
warranty effective beyond the date of closing.

(Appendix 3, p.

6, 7, 10) or (Defendant Spectrum Development Corporation's
Memorandum of Points and Authorities Regarding Implied Warranty
of Habitability p. 6, 7, 10)
17.

Based on KIMBALL'S position, the decision rendered

by the Trial Court, and their own understanding of the Agreement,
FORSBERGS included a statement in their proposed findings of fact
that the express builders' warranty was effective beyond the
closing date.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Appendix

4 p. 2, para. 5)
18.

In response to this, well after the Trial Court

had rendered its decision, KIMBALL filed objections to the
findings, now claiming that the express warranty did not apply.
(Defendant Spectrum Development's Objections to Plaintiffs'
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
(Appendix 5, p. 2-3)

5

p. 2-3) or

19.

After a hearing regarding the express warranty on

November 16, 1992, the Trial Court issued a Minute Entry on
November 24, 1992 that objections to the plaintiffs7 recovery
under the express builders7 warranty were sustained.

The Trial

Court made no reference to any facts or law presented.

(Minute

Entry of Nov. 24, 1992) or (Appendix 6)
SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT
There is sufficient testimony within the record supporting
the Trial Court's finding of negligent misrepresentation by
KIMBALL.

It is the special duty of the trier of fact to

determine which witnesses are credible and which are not.

After

hearing all of the testimony on the issue the trier of fact
determined that FORSBERGS reasonably relied on KIMBALL'S
misrepresentation regarding the size of the yard of the home.
When all of the evidence and testimony supporting this finding is
marshalled, it is clear that there is adequate foundation for the
finding of negligent misrepresentation.
The Trial Court also had ample evidence to calculate the
damages caused by the negligent misrepresentation.

Evidence

admitted stated both an area map of the false representation of
the backyard, and the actual dimensions of the backyard.

By

simply subtracting the area of the actual yard from the area that
was represented the Court derived the area that FORSBERGS were
told they were getting which they did not get.

6

This area of land

has a value assessed by the square foot.

Therefore the damages

are easily calculated.
In addition, FORSBERGS cross-appeal the Trial Courts
conclusions of law concerning the theory of implied warranty of
habitability.

Although FORSBERGS agree with the Trial Court that

there is an implied warranty of habitability in the sale of new
homes, the Trial Court did not properly apply the doctrine.

As a

matter of law, when a home is not built in a workmanlike manner
which causes water to actually flow through the basement, snow to
accumulate in the interior walls, and pipes inside the house to
freeze and rupture in 26 places, the home is "uninhabitable."
The Trial Court properly found that because the home was not
built in a workmanlike manner these problems arose.

However, the

Trial Court improperly applied the law when it concluded that
KIMBALL did not breach the implied warranty of habitability
because the defects did not render the home "uninhabitable."
Because the home was uninhabitable as a matter of law, FORSBERGS
should be reimbursed the amount of money spent to bring the home
up to a level of habitability.
In addition to the implied warranty, there was an express
builders7 one-year warranty against defects in workmanship.

This

express warranty exists as an express part of the Earnest Money
Sales Agreement and is not included in the implied warranty of
habitability.

Even if this Court decides that, as a matter of
7

law, the home was habitable, the Trial Court's findings clearly
show that the home was not built in a workmanlike manner.
Because the defects complained of were discovered within the
first year, they fall within this express warranty.
has argued that this warranty was intended to apply.

Even KIMBALL
In

discounting this express warranty, the Trial Court made no
findings of fact, nor did it refer to any conclusions of law.
The Trial Court's decision is not supported by the evidence, is
contrary to KIMBALL'S own admissions, and is contrary to Utah
law.

Therefore, this ruling should be reversed and the express

builders' warranty should be held to apply.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OP NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION IS WELL SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
The Trial Court's findings are not clearly erroneous, but
are solidly founded in the evidence.

The Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure state that "[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral
or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the Trial Court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."
R.Civ.P. 52(a).

Utah

The Utah Supreme Court explained how this is to

be applied in Gravson Roper LTD. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467 (Utah

8

1989).

"To successfully attack a trial court's findings of fact,

an appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of
the findings and then demonstrate that the evidence, including
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to
support the findings against an attack under the rule 52(a)
standard."

Id. at 470 (emphasis added).

The Utah Supreme Court gave further instructions on how to
apply the rule 52(a) standard in Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182
(Utah 1991).

In Reed the Court stated:

It is the province of the trier of fact to assess the
credibility of witnesses, and we will not second-guess the
trial court where there is a reasonable basis to support its
findings. In order to challenge the court's findings of
fact, the defendant must marshal all of the evidence in
favor of the findings and then demonstrate that even when
reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the
findings. Id. at 1184 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
This standard has been summed up in Gillmor v. Wright, 850
P.2d 431 (Utah 1993) as the "clearly erroneous" standard.

The

Gillmor court stated:
We review these findings of fact under the clearly
erroneous standard. Appellants must marshal the
evidence in support of the findings and then
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the findings
are so lacking in support that they are against the
clear weight of the evidence, thus clearly erroneous.
Id. at 433.
Therefore, appellants must marshal all the evidence that
supports, either directly or by inference, the findings of the
trial court.

Appellants must go further than merely showing that

9

testimony exists which is contrary to a trial courts findings.
This did not happen in the case at bar.

In the instant case,

KIMBALL makes many references to Appellee's testimony on direct
and cross examination, but omits Appellant's testimony from the
first day of trial.

This crucial testimony is included below.

KIMBALL claims three factual findings are in error:

First,

whether there was a misrepresentation concerning the size of the
yard (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (hereinafter
"Findings") p. 5, para. No. 25); Second, whether the FORSBERGS
reasonably relied on the misrepresentation (Findings p. 5, para.
No. #26) ; Third, whether the yard size was actually smaller than
what was represented causing $21,767.90 in damages (Findings
p. 5, para. No. 27). Additionally, KIMBALL claims that the
credibility of witnesses is not an issue because the witnesses
"essentially agreed on the major points."

(Brief of Christensen

& Kimball and Victor M. Kimball p. 25)
The credibility of the witnesses is critical because
FORSBERGS and KIMBALL disagree in testimony concerning the one
pivotal point of the negligent misrepresentation issue.

That

point is whether KIMBALL told FORSBERGS the poplar trees were
"within" the property.

Dr. Forsberg stated that Kimball told him

the property line was "beyond the trees."

(R. 1718)

Kimball

testified that he did not tell Forsberg that the trees were on
the property.

(R. 1163).

It is reasonable, therefore, to infer

10

that the court found Forsberg's testimony more credible than
Kimball's.
That inference is important as the rest of the evidence is
analyzed, for it highlights the importance of Kimball's testimony
from cross examination which was omitted in KIMBALL'S brief.
First, there was evidence concerning the size of the yard.

There

are two important representations dealing with the size of the
yard.

First, the FACT SHEET which stated that the yard size was

"98' x 102', flat back yard with room for a pool."
1).

(Appendix

Second, KIMBALL gave a verbal representation to FORSBERGS

regarding the size of the yard.

Dr. Forsberg testified on direct

exam that:
Question: Did you have some discussion with Mr. Kimball
about those poplar trees?
Answer:

Yes, I did.

Question: Tell us what you said and what he said, as best
you can.
Answer:

Well, I was trying to confirm the boundaries of
the backyard, and I asked him about the poplar
trees. And he related to me that the poplar trees
were a reflection of the backyard, roughly the
back west boundary of the yard. In further
pursuing that —

Question: Go ahead. In further pursuing that, did he
describe it in any other way?
Answer:

He described that the poplars — because there
were no landscape markers there, I was concerned
as to exactly where the back corners and back
property lines were, and he assured me that the
poplar trees were within the property of the
residence for sale.
11

Question: Within the property?
Answer:

Correct.

(R. 1718, L. 2-21)

On cross-examination, Dr. Forsberg continued to give similar
testimony that he was told that the property line was somewhere
beyond the trees.

(R. 1813-14)

The FACT SHEET and this testimony are adequate, even
plentiful to show that the Trial Court properly found that there
was a representation regarding the exact size of the property.
KIMBALL has not met its burden of proving the Trial Court's
finding is "clearly erroneous."

The second finding in question

is whether it was reasonable for FORSBERGS to rely on the
representations about the yard size.

This finding centers on the

law regarding the duties of each party in a sale of property to
know the size of the property being sold.

In Duaan v. Jones. 615

P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980) the Utah Supreme Court detailed the duties
of the different parties to the sale of property.

A vendor of

property, the Appellants in the case at bar, has "a special duty
to know the truth of his representations or where the nature of
the situation is such the vendor is presumed to know the facts to
which his representation relates, a misrepresentation is
fraudulent even though not made knowingly, willfully or with
actual intent to deceive."

Id. at 1246 (emphasis added).

The Duaan court further explained the right of the purchaser
to rely on the assertions made by the vendor, stating:

12

In the Restatement, Torts 2nd, Sec. 538A, Comment e, p.
84, it is stated:
"Quantity as a fact. A statement of the
quantity of either land or chattels is a
statement of fact. A purchaser of either is
entitled to assume that the vendor knows the
acreage of the land or the quantity of a lot
of goods that he is selling. This is true
although the vendors statement does not
assert or imply that it is based upon a
survey of the land or a measurement, weighing
or count of the goods.11
Furthermore, a vendee of real property, in the absence
of facts putting him on notice, has no duty to
investigate to determine whether the vendor has
misrepresented the area conveyed. Neither is a vendee
estopped from recovering for misrepresentation of the
area of the land conveyed merely because he viewed or
inspected the premises, so long as he did not endeavor
to determine independently the exact quantity of land.
Nor is a vendee estopped from recovering in an action
for deceit because he had the opportunity to inspect or
otherwise check the property prior to purchase. Id. at
1246-47 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
This case shows that a builder, or vendor, has a duty to know
whether his representations are truthful.

This means the vendor

has the duty to investigate to learn the truth of his
representations.

This case also shows that a buyer has the right

to assume that the vendor has been truthful in his
representations, unless there are facts which should put the
buyer on notice.

The fact that vendor does not do his duty to

investigate is not sufficient to put a buyer on notice, or this
simple omission would completely destroy the rule.
In the instant case, KIMBALL made a specific representation
in the FACT SHEET regarding the size of the yard.
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Additionally,

KIMBALL removed the one statement from the FACT SHEET that may
have actually put FORSBERGS on notice•

KIMBALL testified:

Question: And you took this fact sheet and blocked out or
whited out or covered up the Ramsey Group name at
the bottom and put in your brothers name at the
bottom; correct?
Answer:

Yes. We removed a statement at the bottom, along
with their name, that said, "Reliable but not
guaranteed information," along with their name.

Question: Sorry?
Answer:

Apparently at the bottom, from what I have been
told, is that there was a statement that said,
"This information is reliable but not guaranteed",
and then the Ramsey Group. [question] Who told
you that?

Answer:

Linda Wolcott told me that.

Question: But you covered that up and put your name and Dave
Kimball?
Answer:

Yes.

(R. 2095, L. 12-25; R. 2096, L. 1-2)

Furthermore, this FACT SHEET was titled "FACT SHEET," not
"General Information Sheet" or some other title.

The title

itself conveys an assurance that what is in the sheet is true.
There is no notice within the title to alert FORSBERGS that the
information is false or just a guess, just the opposite is true!
It is reasonable for the Trial Court to infer from this that
FORSBERGS were not on notice, and, therefore, had no duty to
investigate further.
Additionally, the Dugan court puts a duty on the seller to
know the size of his property.

In the instant case, KIMBALL is a

14

licensed real estate broker.

(R. 1200)

He is experienced in the

business of selling and developing homes.

However, he failed in

this duty to know the boundaries as shown by his direct
examination:
Question: At any time during the time that you were
attempting to sell this home, Mr. Kimball,did you
know where the specific corners of the lot were?
Answer:

I did not know where the back corners of this lot
were. I believe in the front of the house there
were nails driven into the sidewalk or into the
gutter denoting the front line. (R. 1161, L. 1723)

Furthermore, it was KIMBALL7s desire that FORSBERGS rely on
the information in the FACT SHEET. KIMBALL Appellants used the
FACT SHEET with its reference to the size of the backyard for the
express purpose of conveying information to prospective buyers
when he was not at the home.

In KIMBALL'S own testimony during

cross examination we learn:
Question: (By Mr. Hintze) What was the purpose of that fact
sheet, Mr. Kimball?
Answer:

To give general information as to the home.

Question: Did you intend that prospective buyers would look
at this fact sheet?
Answer:

Yes.

Question: And it was so disseminated for that purpose;
right?
Answer:

Yes.

(R. 2095, L. 1-3; R. 2096, L. 16-21)
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This is exactly what happened.

When FORSBERGS first entered

the home they picked up a FACT SHEET and read it, as shown by
Appellee Dr. Forsberg's testimony:
Question: Okay.
Answer:

What transpired?

We gained entry through the front door and walked
through the house.

Question: And let me ask you first of all, did you obtain a
copy of a document called the fact sheet?
Answer:

Yes.
•

We did.

• •

Question: Did you read it? Did you personally read it as
you went through that walk-through?
Answer:

Yes, we did.
2).

(R. 1702, L. 1-6, 25; R. 1703, L. 1-

Although there was nothing on the FACT SHEET to indicate to
FORSBERGS that it contained false information, they did
investigate further.

When they were in the home with KIMBALL,

they questioned him about the size of the backyard.

Appellee Dr.

Forsberg testified that "I was concerned as to exactly where the
back corners and back property lines were, and he [Victor
Kimball] assured me that the poplar trees were within the
property of the residence for sale."

(R. 1718).

FORSBERGS had

no reason to doubt Mr. Kimball, or question whether he had told
them the truth.
FORSBERGS had read the FACT SHEET as to the size of the
yard, but were not sure just how big that was.

1A

Upon questioning

Appellant, whom they rightfully presumed would know, they were
given false information upon which they relied.

FORSBERGS did

not ask KIMBALL "How far is 98 feet from here?"

They did not

have to.

FORSBERGS presumed that KIMBALL knew what was on the

FACT SHEET as well as they did.

Therefore, they asked for some

type of visual reference point.

KIMBALL gave them that reference

point, indicating a row of poplar trees he had planted.

Once the

reference point was given, FORSBERGS presumed that KIMBALL was
correct.
KIMBALL erroneously argues that FORSBERGS were on notice and
had a duty to investigate further.

However, the pnly fact that

KIMBALL uses to support this claim is that it was clear that
KIMBALL did not know how big the backyard was, or the location of
the back boundary.

Since KIMBALL had the duty to investigate and

learn the truth of his representation, the Trial Court properly
found that this was not sufficient notice to shift the duty to
investigate to FORSBERGS.

Any other conclusion would defeat the

finding of Dugan that the vendor has a "special duty to know the
truth of his representation."
The final part of the Trial Court's finding of negligent
misrepresentation called into question is the issue of proper
damages.

The Dugan Court set out in clear and plain language the

proper measure of damages stating "[t]he proper measure of
damages in an action for fraud and deceit is the difference
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between the value of the property purchased and the value it
would have had if the representations were true, viz., the
benefit of the bargain rule."

Dugan, 615 P.2d at 1247.

This is the very formula that the Trial Court used.

The

backyard was represented as "98' x 102'" which calculates to
9,996 square feet.

FORSBERGS did not receive a backyard that was

98' x 102'. Appellant Victor Kimball testified that the yard was
not that large:
Question: Right. Now, is the back yard of this house 98 by
one hundred two?
Answer:

The back yard itself?

Question: Yes.
Answer:

No, it's not. It's 98 from the front to the back
on each of the —

Question: I understand what you're — just respond to my
question. Just respond to the question I ask.
understood that the entire dimensions of the —
understood that's the entire dimensions of the
lot. But this doesn't say it's describing the
lot, does it?
Answer:

No. It says "Yard Size".

I
I

(R. 2098, L. 14-25)

On cross-examination, Dr. Forsberg similarly testified:
Question: You have testified earlier that the yard as
presented by Mr. Vic Kimball had something to do
with these poplar trees, I guess; is that correct?
Answer:

That's correct.

Question: And how far beyond the actual property line were
those poplar trees?
Answer:

They were — the representations of my
measurements there on this poster, and they vary

18

from anywhere from three to four feet on the
northeast to approximately fourteen to fifteen
feet.
Quest-ion: And fourteen to fifteen feet here in the center?
Answer:

Correct.

(R. 1804, L. 3-15)

Later, after the backyard was surveyed, Dr. Forsberg measured the
size of his backyard.

This measurement was roughly drawn to

scale on a diagram that the Trial Court accepted as Exhibit P-34.
(R. 1721-22).

From these measurements, FORSBERGS calculated that

the back yard was actually only 4,342 square feet.

If the

representation of the FACT SHEET had been true, FORSBERGS would
have received another 5,654 square feet of property.

At the time

of the sale, the property was valued at $3.85 per square foot.
Damages of $21,767.90 is calculated by multiplying 5,368 square
feet by $3.85 per square foot.
As this Court reviews this evidence, and applies the
"clearly erroneous" standard as set forth, it must affirm the
Trial Court,s finding of negligent misrepresentation.

None of

the Trial Court's findings "are so lacking in support that they
are against the clear weight of the evidence."

Rather, each

finding is well supported by the evidence, and reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom.
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II.
AN IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY IS
GROUNDED IN SOUND PUBLIC POLICY AND SHOULD BE
ADOPTED BY THE UTAH COURTS.
Utah should join with its sister states and adopt the
warranty of habitability in the sale of new homes.

Utah is one

of the few states which has not addressed the issue and adopted
the warranty.

(Cf. Wade v. Jobe. 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991); P.H.

Inv. v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018 (Utah 1991).)

Recently the Nevada

Supreme Court adopted the warranty in Radaker v. Scott. 855 P.2d
1037 (Nev. 1993).

Commenting on the prevalence of the warranty,

it stated "At least thirty-eight of the forty-one states which
have addressed the issue of whether a builder/vendor impliedly
warrants habitability have ruled in favor of the warranty.

Of

the thirty-eight states embracing the warranty, only Maryland has
done so through the legislative process." Id. at 1042.
A quick review of the reasoning of several of the courts
which have adopted the warranty reveals a natural conclusion to
adopt the warranty.

Nevada discovered this stating "We agree

with the virtual consensus among courts in our sister states that
the implied warranty of habitability reflects a naturally
expected and sound public policy.

We accordingly recognize and

adopt the warranty in this jurisdiction."
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Id.

At least thirty-

nine states have now adopted the warranty including Nevada supra,
Idaho1, Montana2, Wyoming3, Colorado4, Arizona5, and California6,
A.

A warranty of implied habitabilitv is needed to protect
the public

One of the main purposes of the warranty, as shown by its
history, is to put liability on the person who has the most
expertise and ability to make certain of the quality.

The

history of the warranty has been stated by many courts.

The

Illinois Supreme Court summed it up in Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf,
441 N.E.2d 324, 328 (111. 1982):
The implied warranty of habitability was first
recognized in the English case of Miller v. Cannon Hill
Estates, Ltd. (1931), 2 K.B. 113. The court said that
in the purchase of an unfinished house the builder was
aware that his buyer intended to live in the house and
therefore impliedly warranted that it would be suitable
for that purpose. (2 K.B. 113.) In 1957 an Ohio court
in Vanderschrier v. Aaron (1957), 103 Ohio App. 340,
140 N.E.2d 819, applied the Miller rule for the first
time in the United States. In 1964 the Colorado
Supreme Court extended the implied warranty to a
completed house. Carpenter v. Donohoe (1964), 154
Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399.

!
2

Chandler v. Madsen. 642 P.2d 1028 (Mont. 1982).

3
4

Bethlahmv v. Bechtel. 415 P.2d 698 (Idaho 1966).

Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975).

Carpenter v. Donohoe, 388 P.2d 399 (Colo. 1961).

5

Richards v. Powercraft Homes, Inc., 678 P.2d 427 (Ariz.
1984).
6

Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Development Co., 525 P.2d 88 (Cal.
1974).
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Many cases also refer to the demise of the doctrine of
caveat emptor as applied to the sale of new homes in explaining
why the implied warranty should be effective.

This was

summarized in Chandler v. Madsen, 642 P.2d 1028 (Mont. 1981).
There the Montana Supreme Court stated:
Caveat emptor, which traditionally has applied to sales
of real estate, developed at a time when a buyer and
seller were in equal bargaining positions. They were
of comparable skill and knowledge and each could
protect himself in a transaction.
In the modern marketplace that equality of
position no longer necessarily exists, and a growing
number of jurisdictions have abandoned caveat emptor in
favor of implied warranties where a builder-vendor
sells a new residence. [Citations]

The doctrine of caveat emptor no longer serves the
realities of the marketplace. Therefore we hold that
the builder-vendor of a new home impliedly warrants
that the residence is constructed in a workmanlike
manner and is suitable for habitation. Id. at 1031
(citations omitted).
The Utah Supreme Court has already acknowledged this demise of
caveat emptor. stating "[i]n this state, it is apparent that the
rule of caveat emptor does not apply to those dealing with a
licensed real estate agent."
(Utah 1980).

Duaan v. Jones. 615 P.2d 1239, 1248

From Dugan, it is a small step for Utah to reach an

implied warranty of habitability in the sale of new homes.
Courts have taken this changed view for good reason, it is
good public policy.

As the Illinois court explained:
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The warranty of habitability is a creature of public
policy. It is a judicial innovation that has evolved
to protect purchasers of new houses upon discovery of
latent defects in their homes. While the warranty of
habitability has roots in the execution of the contract
for sale, we emphasize that it exists independently.
Redarowicz, 441 N.E.2d at 330 (citations omitted).
In Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975), the Wyoming
Supreme Court gave the reason at the core of this public policy.
The Tavares court stated:
Building construction by modern methods is complex and
intertwined with governmental codes and regulations.
The ordinary home buyer is not in a position, by skill
or training, to discover defects lurking in the
plumbing, the electrical wiring, the structure itself,
all of which is usually covered up and not open for
inspection.
A home buyer should be able to place reliance on the
builder or developer who sells him a new house. The
improved real estate the average family buys gives it
thoughtful pause not only because of the base price but
the interest involved over a long period of time. This
is usually the largest single purchase a family makes
for a lifetime. Id. at 1279 (emphasis added).
In other words, this warranty is based on the relationship
between the builder and the buyer of the home.
The Colorado Supreme Court realized this in Sloat v.
Matheny, 625 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Colo. 1981) (emphasis added)
stating "[t]he position of the builder-vendor, as compared to the
buyer, dictates that the builder bear the risk that the house is
fit for its intended use."
The Colorado Court continued:
These implied warranties are also consistent with the
expectations of the parties. "Clearly every builder23

vendor holds himself out, expressly or impliedly, as
having the expertise necessary to construct a livable
dwelling. It is equally as obvious that almost every
buyer acts upon these representations and expects that
the new house he is buying, whether already constructed
or not yet built, will be suitable for use as a home.
Otherwise there would be no sale." McDonald v.
Mianecki, supra. See also Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles
Develop. Co.. 12 Cal.3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal.Rptr.
648 (1974); Duncan v. Schuster Graham Homes, Inc.,
supra: Petersen v. Hubschman Const. Co., Inc., supra.
Another rationale for the rule is to "inhibit the
unscrupulous, fly-by-night, or unskilled builder and to
discourage much of the sloppy work and jerry building
that has become perceptible over the years." Capra v.
Smith, 372 So.2d 321, 323 (Ala. 1979) (Id.)
Other courts have agreed.

"The court reasoned that the skill and

integrity of the builder-vendor is relied upon by the purchaser
who is not capable of making a meaningful inspection of the
house."

Redarowicz, 441 N.E.2d at 329.

The Illinois court

further declared "[i]f construction of a new house is defective,
its repair costs should be borne by the responsible buildervendor who created the latent defect."

Id. at 3 30.

Arizona added "[t]he guiding principle of Richards v.
Powercraft is that innocent purchasers should be protected and
builders held accountable for their work."

Nastri v. Wood Bros.

Homes, Inc., 690 P.2d 158, 161 (Ariz.App. 1984) (emphasis added).
The Montana Supreme Court stated:
The concept here is not one of fault or wrong-doing
but, rather, where one of two innocent parties will
suffer, which was in the better position to prevent the
harm?
Whether or not there was reason for Madsen to
suspect the problem, as the builder-vendor he clearly
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was in the better position to prevent the problem.
Chandler, 642 P.2d at 1032.
A review of these cases reveals several key factors to this
public policy of impliedly warranting habitability.

First,

habitability is the basis of the bargain between the buildervendor and the buyer.

Second, the builder-vendor is in a

superior position over the buyer in technical knowledge as well
as knowledge of the defects.

Third, the builder-vendor is in the

best position to prevent the defects through proper workmanship.
Fourth, the builder-vendor is in the best position to bear the
risk that the home is fit.

Fifth, it is necessary to protect

buyers from unscrupulous builder-vendors.
Now, more than ever, Utah needs to acknowledge the warranty
of habitability.

Although this is a policy good for all times,

there is a particular vulnerability among buyers at this time.
New homes are being sold nearly as fast as they are built.

This

leaves the door open for the "fly-by-night" and other
unscrupulous builder-vendors to take advantage of buyers.

The

average buyer does not have the technical skill and knowledge of
the average builder-vendor.

Without the implied warranty of

habitability there is no route of recovery, or method of
protection for the buyer.

This Court should adopt the implied

warranty of habitability doctrine in the sale of new homes.
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B.

This Court should adopt a broader view of the scope of
the implied warranty of habitability than that
acknowledged by the Trial Court.

Only a view broader than mere "livability" encompasses all
of the public policy concerns that are at the heart of the
implied warranty of habitability.
warranty is a legal conclusion.

Determining the scope of the
"When reviewing the district

court's conclusions of law, we give no deference to the court but
review those conclusions for correctness."
1184-85.

Reed, 806 P.2d at

Therefore, this Court is not bound by the Trial Court's

narrow and restrictive view in interpreting the implied warranty
of habitability, but should apply the view that best fits the
policy reasons for adopting the warranty.
The scope of the warranty is directly tied to the meaning of
the term "habitability."

Some courts have viewed this to mean

that if it is at all possible to live in the structure, it is
habitable.

However, other courts give a broader interpretation.

Illinois has done this, stating "[i]n defining the scope of the
warranty the court found that the house must be reasonably suited
for its intended use and not simply inhabitable."
441 N.E.2d at 329 (emphasis added).

Redarowicz.

Before reaching its own

conclusion regarding the scope of the warranty, an Arizona court
explained how Illinois rejected a narrow interpretation of
"habitable," stating:
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The first, Goggin v. Fox Valley Construction Corp. , 48
Ill.App.3d 103, 38 111.Dec. 271, 365 N.E.2d 509 (1977)
contains the following holding:
The primary function of a new home is to
shelter its inhabitants from the elements.
If a new home does not keep out the elements
because of a substantial defect of
construction, such a home is not habitable
within the meaning of the implied warranty of
habitability. . . .
We do not agree with this strict standard and neither
does the Supreme Court of Illinois. That court
expressed its disagreement in Petersen v. Hubschman
Construction Co.. supra.
. . . The mere fact that the house is capable
of being inhabited does not satisfy the
implied warranty. The use of the term
"habitability" is perhaps unfortunate.
Because of its imprecise meaning it is
susceptible of misconstruction. It would
more accurately convey the meaning of the
warranty as used in this context if it were
to be phrased in language similar to that
used in the Uniform Commercial Code, warranty
of merchantability, or warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose. 389 N.E.2d at
1158. Nastri v. Wood Bros. Homes. Inc.. 690
P.2d 158, 162-3 (Ariz.App. 1984) (emphasis
added).
The Arizona court concluded that the warranty is one "of
workmanship and habitability.

We believe that to be the law in

our state, i.e., that there is no distinction except insofar as
the extent of the damage arising from latent defects may be
greater if the home has actually become unlivable."

Id. at 163,

The Colorado Appellate Court took the same view in Roper v.
Spring Lake Development Co.. 789 P.2d 483 (Colo.App. 1990),
After reviewing several cases it stated:
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These cases strongly indicate that prior case law did
not require the buyer to prove both that the house was
not built in a workmanlike manner and that it was
unsuitable for habitation. Thus, a buyer is entitled
to relief based on the theory of implied warranty of
habitability if he proves the house was not built in a
workmanlike manner or that it was not suitable for
habitation. Id. at 485 (emphasis added).
The Roper court then listed examples of when the warranty was
breached for different types of defects in the home, stating:
Courts in other jurisdictions have extended implied
warranty of habitability to situations in which the
house is defective or unhabitable for reasons other
than the workmanship in constructing the house. See
McDonald v. Mianecki. 79 N.J. 275, 398 A.2d 1283 (1979)
(well water not potable and bad odor present);
Jeanguneat v. Jackie Hames Construction Co., 576 P.2d
761 (Okla. 1978) (bad well water); Bethlahmv v.
Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966) (basement
flooded periodically and offensive odor forced
inhabitants to move out); Park v. Sohn, 89 111.2d 453,
60 111.Dec. 609, 433 N.E.2d 651 (1982) (water puddles
formed in crawl space causing odors); Kirk v. Ridgwav,
373 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1985) (peeling paint on exterior
of house); Waggoner v. Midwestern Development, Inc.. 83
S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967) (high water table caused
water to seep into basement); Hoye v. Century Builders,
52 Wash.2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958) (continual
discharge of raw sewage); Pickler v. Fisher, 7 Ark.App.
125, 644 S.W.2d 644 (1983). Id. (emphasis added).
In Deisch v. Jav (790 P.2d 1273, 1276 (Wyo. 1990)) the
Wyoming Supreme Court also found that the home buyer may prevail
by showing either poor workmanship or uninhabitability, stating
"the implied warranty rule accommodates either a recovery of
money damages for minor defects susceptible of remedy or
rescission and restitution for major defects which render the
house unfit for habitation and which are not readily remediable."
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The Arizona Court of Appeals summed up this theory in one
sentence, stating "it would be the height of cynicism to allow a
shoddy builder to escape liability because his work was not
shoddy enough."

Nastri, 690 P.2d at 163.

This broader view is not unreasonable, nor does it unduly
tax the ability of the builder-vendor.
standard.

Perfection is not the

The Arizona court explained "The test for breach of

that warranty is reasonableness, not perfection; the standard
being, ordinarily, the quality of work that would be done by a
worker of average skill and intelligence."

Id.

Simply stated, a

worker of average skill and intelligence builds a home in a
workmanlike manner.

If facts of an individual case show that the

home was not built in a workmanlike manner, then the worker of
average skill and intelligence has breached the implied warranty
of habitability.
It took several years for the Illinois' court to reach this
view.

Other courts like Arizona, Colorado, and Wyoming, as shown

above, saw the strength of the broader view quicker because of
the example of Illinois' experience.

Similarly, this Court

should not require Utah home-buyers to go through years of trials
to establish that the scope of the warranty should be more than
mere livability.

It is plain that the policy reasons behind the

warranty cannot be fully achieved unless this Court applies a
broader standard than did the Trial Court.
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The implied warranty

of habitability was meant to protect against a broader range of
defects due to poor workmanship than simply whether the person is
driven from their home, or the home completely collapses.

This

Court should set forth this broader, proper interpretation of the
implied warranty of habitability which encompasses the full power
of the policy reasons creating it.
Under the theories described above, KIMBALL has breached the
implied warranty of habitability.

The Trial Court specifically

found that FORSBERGS' home was not built in a workmanlike manner:
9. This flooding was the result of the Home not
being built in a workmanlike manner sufficient to keep
it watertight. (R.
)
13. The burst water pipes were cause by a lack of
workmanlike construction. (R.
)
21. The painting of the exterior decks and
railings was not done in a workmanlike fashion.
(R.
)
This factual conclusion is not in dispute, the home was not built
in a workmanlike manner.
This Court should adopt the view

as stated in Roper above

"a buyer is entitled to relief based on the theory of implied
warranty of habitability if he proves the house was not built in
a workmanlike manner . . .."

That is, if the Trial Court finds

that the house was not built in a workmanlike manner, it must
find for the buyer as a matter of law.

Therefore, as a matter of

law, KIMBALL breached the warranty of habitability.

The Trial Court's conclusion that the implied warranty of
habitability does not apply should be reversed, and FORSBERGS
should be awarded damages incurred due to the poor workmanship.
The damages stemming from the flooding, burst water pipes, and
poor painting are set forth in the record:
1. The damages flowing from the failure to build
the home in a workmanlike manner sufficient to keep it
watertight are reflected in Exhibits 71 through 73 and
Exhibit 64, plus a total of $450 attributable to time
spent by the Plaintiff Farrell Forsberg, for a total of
$10,591.21. All these costs are reasonable and were
reasonably incurred.
2. With respect to the frozen and burst pipes
caused by a lack of workmanlike construction, but for
the insurance, Plaintiffs would have suffered damages
as reflected in Exhibits P-46 through P-52, 57-62, and
66-70, totaling $5,169.92, all of which were reasonable
in amount.
4. With respect to the flaking paint on the
railings and the decks, this was not a latent defect.
Nevertheless, for the eventuality of the Defendant
being found liable for the painting defects, the cost
to repair is reflected in Exhibit 44 and is the sum of
$3,049.00 which the court finds reasonable and
necessary.
The total of damages caused by the defects is $18,810.13.

In

other words, FORSBERGS had to spend an additional $18,810.13 in
order to bring their home up to the level of a workmanlike
product.

KIMBALL promised, through the implied warranty of

habitability, that they were selling a home built in a
workmanlike manner, but they did not sell such a home.

It will

be a windfall to KIMBALL if they are not held responsible for
their shoddy work.
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This Court should give no deference to the Trial Court's
conclusion of law, and reverse the finding that the implied
warranty of habitability is limited to defects causing the home
to be unlivable.

This Court should follow courts such as

Illinois, Arizona, Colorado, and Wyoming in interpreting the
scope of the warranty to include defects caused when the home is
not built in a workmanlike manner.

In doing so, this Court will

give the full meaning to the public policy on which the warranty
is centered.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT
F0RSBER6S WAIVED THE EXPRESS BUILDE*VS
WARRANTY AND SHOULD BE OVERTURNED.
The Trial Court disregarded claims and admissions of both
parties in finding a waiver of the express builders' warranty.
This finding of the court is contrary to reasoned Utah law, and
goes against the intent of both KIMBALL and FORSBERGS.

"It is

well settled that /[c]ontracts are to be construed in light of
the reasonable expectations of the parties as evidenced by the
purpose and language of the contract.' Nixon and Nixon, Inc. v.
John New & Assocs., 641 P.2d 144,146 (Utah 1982)"

HCA Health

Serv. v. St. Mark's Charities, 846 P.2d 476 (Utah App. 1993).
"The intent of the parties at the time they entered into the
agreement controls the meaning of the written contract."
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Founders Bank and Trust Co, v. Upsher, 830 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Okl.
1992) .
In the case at hand, the Trial Court attempts to rewrite the
contract between FORSBERGS and KIMBALL to exclude the one-year
builder's warranty on workmanship.

This goes against the intent

of both parties, both as expressed in the Earnest Money Sales
Agreement, and as expressed through the course of the trial. The
Earnest Money Sales Agreement was accepted as Plaintiffs exhibit
no. 28. These relevant sections are as follows:
B. INSPECTION . . . Buyer accepts the property in "asis" condition subject to Seller's warranties as
outlined in Section 6.
O. ABROGATION. Except for express warranties made in
this Agreement, execution and delivery of final closing
documents shall abrogate this Agreement.
6. SELLERS WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties
contained in Section C, the following items are also
warranted: Seller to give a 1 year builders warranty
on the entire home. (Appendix 2, p. 1, 4, 5)
There is no dispute between the parties that Sections B and
0 of the agreement were to preserve both section C and section 6
beyond closing.

KIMBALL very carefully set out its position in

this regard in a supplemental brief to the Trial Court after the
trial was concluded.
After the trial, but before rendering its decision, the
Trial Court requested some additional information on the implied
warranty of habitability.

KIMBALL filed a supplemental brief to

the Trial Court to better set forth their position on this issue
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(attached hereto as Appendix 3).

In this final word to the

Court, KIMBALL explained their view of the applicability of
section B of the Earnest Money Agreement, and how it related to
the one-year builder's warranty, stating "the Plaintiffs
[FORSBERGS] specifically negotiated a one-year builder's warranty
on the entire home.

By the very terms of Section 0 of the

Earnest Money Sales Agreement, this and any other express
warranties survived the execution and delivery of final closing
documents."

(Appendix 3, p. 6)(emphasis added)

"Plaintiffs

included an express one-year builders' warranty in their offer,
which was accented by the Seller."
added)

"F.

(Appendix 3, p. 7)(emphasis

Plaintiffs, with the exception of the one-year

builders' warranty and the warranties set forth in Section C of
the Earnest Money Sales Agreement (Ex. 28), expressly accepted
the property 'as is.'"

(Appendix 3, p. 10)(emphasis added).

FORSBERGS agree with this position that the one-year
builders' warranty was accepted by KIMBALL and was effective
beyond the closing date.

There is no dispute and no ambiguity.

The Trial Court has no authority to sua sponte evaluate the
agreement and impose its own interpretation.

A case that stands

for this is Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d
1028 (Utah 1985).

Both parties meant what they have said.

is no waiver of the builders' warranty.
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There

The Trial Court erred

when it interpreted the agreement to waive the builders' warranty
and should be reversed.
Because there is no waiver of the warranty, the warranty
applies to all damages incurred by FORSBERGS.

All defects

complained of were discovered within the one year time limit on
the express warranty, and were found to be due to poor
workmanship.

As noted above, the damages stemming from the

frozen pipes, flooding basement, and poor painting is $18,810.13.
These damages were all found by the Trial Court to be reasonable.
FORSBERGS should be awarded this sum under the one-year builders7
warranty.
One further point on this issue is the Trial Court's finding
regarding paragraph three of the supplemental findings.
not based on applicable law, and should be reversed.

This is

The fact

that FORSBERGS paid for the repairs to the frozen pipes, and the
rooms, with money received from an insurance company does not
take away KIMBALL'S liability.
FORSBERGS bargained for a home that was built in a
workmanlike manner.

KIMBALL warranted the home to be built in a

workmanlike manner.

Because the home was not built in a

workmanlike manner, KIMBALL received more money than the home was
worth.

If KIMBALL is not held liable for the defect, KIMBALL

will receive a windfall of $18,810.13
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Although the court made proper findings of law, based on the
evidence before it, that the home was not built in a workmanlike
manner, it did not properly apply the law.

The Trial Court

should not have altered the Earnest Money Sales Agreement entered
by the parties but should have let it stand as intended.

As

intended, KIMBALL breached the express builders' warranty and
should pay the $18,810.13 in damages caused by the breach.

CONCLUSION
KIMBALLS have not met their burden of showing that the Trial
Court's findings are "clearly erroneous."

The Trial Court had

sufficient evidence on each point concerning the negligent
misrepresentation to reach its conclusions.

When the evidence is

reviewed, and proper inferences taken, it is clear that the Trial
Court reached a supportable position.

The damage award based on

negligent misrepresentation should stand as awarded by the Trial
Court.
On the other hand, the Trial Court did make two rulings in
law that should be reversed.

Although the Trial Court properly

found that there does exist, as a matter of public policy, an
implied warranty of inhabitability, it improperly applied a
narrow and restrictive view of the scope of "habitable."

This

Court should adopt the warranty as applicable when the buyer of
new home can prove the builders work was not in a workmanlike
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manner.

Applied to the instant case, FORSBERGS should be awarded

$18,810.13, the amount associated with the defects of poor
workmanship.
Furthermore, the Trial Court improperly re-wrote the Earnest
Money Sales Agreement, changing it against the intent and
understanding of both parties.

The Trial Court's conclusion that

the express one-year builders' warranty was waived must therefore
be reversed.

This is an alternate theory by which FORSBERGS can

recover for the poor workmanship.

If this Court finds that the

implied warranty of habitability does not apply in this case, the
damages of $18,810.13 should be awarded under the express
builders' warranty.
Respectfully submitted this 28th day of January, 1994.

HAROLD A. HINTZE
Attorney for FORSBERGS

*

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies
of the foregoing BRIEF to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the
following:
DUANE R. SMITH (A-2996)
310 South Main Street
Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorney for KIMBALLS
Dennis R. James
Mitchell T. Rice
MORGAN & HANSEN
Kearns Building, 8th Floor
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorney for Spectrum Development

HAROLD A. HINTZE
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ADDENDUM

Appendix 1
FACT SHEET

Appendix 2
Earnest Money Sales Agreement

Appendix 3
Defendant Spectrum Development Corporation's Memorandum of Points
and Authorities Regarding Implied Warranty of Habitability

Appendix 4
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Appendix 5
Defendant Spectrum Development's Objections to Plaintiffs'
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Appendix 6
Minute Entry of Nov. 24, 1992
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236n South S c j n i c Drive (2745 East)
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^ 2-^,605.00
PANORAMIC VIEWS from almost every room in this new home in Benchmark.
Be the first owner of these gorgeous hardwood floors, customized kitchen
with adjoining family room, and all that is included in this exciting
three-level contemporary design. Vaulted ceilings, light, bright and
spacious as designed by architect David Rohovit. Some of the details include:

Price:

Reduced to

Construction:

Brick and stucco with charming lattice-work
trim.

Styles-

Customized three-level contemporary.

Entry Level:

Gorgeous entry into living room with fireplace,
formal dining, kitchen/family room, office or
library with fabulous three-quarter bath.

Second Level:

Master suite and bath with Jacuzzi tub, separate
shower, and double sinks. Two additional bedrooms and full bath, large laundry room with
sink, and cozy family room with fireplace. Room
under garage could be a terrific exercise area.

Third Level:

An additional 1,072 square feet of unfinished
space allowing for family expansion or game
rooms, storage, etc. Walk-out to level back
yard area.

Square Footage:

Main: 1,590 1st Level: 1,500
3,090 Finished Square Feet

Yard Size:

95f x 102*, fiat back yard with room for a pool.

Garage:

Two-car and parking pad.

Schools:

Beacon Heights Elementary
Hillside Junior High
Highland High

$260,000.00

2nd Level: 1,072

Imagine having dinner en this beautiful deck overlooking the valley!
quality of this home speaks for itself.
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PLAINTIFFS
. EXHIBIT
* <* ' * * * • £ - -s^*~

Legend

Yes (X)

No (O)

This Is a legally binding contract. Read the entire document carefully before signing.

2
|

DEPOSITION
EXHIBIT

9

—s-2

REALTOR®
GENERAL PROVISIONS
(Sections)

t£r

INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the property, plumbing, heating,
onditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies and rods, winand door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, wall-to-wall carpets, water softener, automatic garage door opener and transmit>), fencing, trees and shrubs.
INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by reason
iy representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to "its condition, size, location, present value, future value, income herefrom or as
i production. Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6. In the event Buyer desires any additional inspection,
inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer.
SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which has not
ill not be remedied prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances of any nature shall
irought current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances shall be sound or in
(factory working condition at closing.
CONDITION OF WELL. Seller warrants that any private well serving the property has, to the best of Seller's knowledge, provided an adquate supply of water and
inued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right.
CONDITION OF SEPTIC TANK. Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is, to the best of Seller's knowledge, in good working order and Seller
no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets all applicable government health and construction standards.
ACCELERATION CLAUSE. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing. Seller shall provide to Buyer written verification as ta whether or not any notes, mortgages,
Js of trust or real estate contracts against the property require the consent of the holder of such instruments) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise
interest rate and/or declare the entire balance due in the event of sale. If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally
•ove the sale, Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notice to Seller or Seller's agent prior to closing. In such case,
arnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer. It is understood and agreed that if provisions for said "Due on Sale" clause are set forth
action 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void.
. TITLE INSPECTION. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing. Seller shall provide to Buyer either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion
preliminary title report on the subject property. Prior to closing, Buyer shall give written notice to Seller or Seller's agent, specifying reasonable objections to title,
reafter. Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure the defect(s) to which Buyer has objected. If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agreeI at closing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the option of the Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties.
> TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected. Seller authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a policy of title insurance to be issued
uch title insurance company as Seller shall designate. Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other than those provided for in said standard form, and
incumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale. If title cannot be made so insurable through an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money
I, unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay any
attation charge.
EXISTING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases. Seller agrees to provide to Buyer not less than five (5) days prior to closing
P3T of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting the property. Unless reasonable written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent prior
tot*ng. Buyer shall take title subject to such leases. If the objections) is not remedied at or prior to dosing, this Agreement shall be null and void, j?v—
CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. During the pendency of this Agreement, Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, nor new leases
wed into, nor shall any substantial alterations or improvements be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer.

/r

DATE:.
indersigned Buyer

/

— • '/

*-- -^*~

.

•*

NEST MONEY, the amount of.

'•/

/

'i--^{

•^/A'

i

C..KZL

''

''

/•T7

'

?'?«-*/

hereby deposits with Brokerage

••>—

/v rr-

. Dollars (S.

xm of.
haU be deposited in accordance .with applicable State Law.
'

Received by.

J.

f

PHone Number

ge

OFFER TO PURCHASE
OPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MOf^EY is given to secure and apply on the purchase of .the property situated at li

s'i-rH-i,

t

•"'/;' ^
*- ' ^ « -.'^>
in the City of
'' .^J^7
•'. ^.' <^:'' EZ
County of -. 'J.S- ,' - ^ /—*- £."' r~f
. Utah,
to any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations, utility or other easements or rights of way, government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer in
nee with Section G. jSaid property is owned by
,.

/ ,*..*-/

i

«

^

;:

•• -'•>

.

^- '• -

.* '.

as sellers, and is more particularly described

j

_

_

IK APPLICABLE BOXES:
NIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY

D Vacant Lot

Dyacant Acreage

IPROVED REAL PROPERTY

•

^Residential

Commercial

D Other

D Condo

•

Other

Included items. Unless excluded below, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property,
following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title:

ffAJ&-

Excluded items. The following items are specifically excluded from this sale:.

CONNECTIONS^ UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS. Seller represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price:
• well
D connected
• other
ET electricity
^connected
jblic sewer 0 connected
iptic tank
D connected
her sanitary system.

G irrigation water / secondary system

iblic water

connected

D TV antenna

ivate water

D connected

0 natural gas

# of shares

D ingress & egress by orivate easement

Company

0 dedicated road

121 paved

ED curb and gutter

D master antenna D prewired

•

0 connected

other rights

.prior to closing, D shall not be furnished.
Survey. A certified survey L_ shall be furnished at the expense of
3uyer Inspection. Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below, accepts it in its present physical
"'' *^<—

jition, except:

r r

•'-" ^ v

*f

^"^

(L
*CHASEPpi(iE AND FINANCING. The total purchase price for the property is* £ * r f ^ . , 'lt/-;fj^/?4*A

*- '/ffi/oo "f^'i

Dollars ($^2-<± *~

—"*
• . / y which represents the aforedescribed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT:

JIIIULJLO

"J.'sr yWf\L'/{/*>

>^£>

/

fi^JS^dJCK

_) which shall be paid as follows:

representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing.

•^

representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed by buyer,

(

which include:
• principal;
• interest;
• taxes; • insurance;
• condo fees;
D other
representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to be

which obligation bears interest at
—

% per annum with monthly payments of S

assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at
which include:
• principal;
• interest;
• taxes;

% per annum with monthly payments of $
D insurance;
• condo fees;
• other

representing balance, if any, including proceeds from a new mortgage loan, or seller, financing, to be paid as follows:

.^
,<>^/=v^

Other.

h r.rn

TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE

r is required to assume an underlying obligation (in which case Section F shall also apply) and/or obtain outside financing. Buyer agrees to use best efforts
e and/or procure same and this offer is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/orfinancing/Buyeragrees
application within
\\ rate not to exceed

^\

days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement to assume the underlying obligationand/or obtain the new financing at
*>* ** B u v e r d°es not qualify for the assumption and/or financing within

/C^'

-AC^

ireement, this Agreement shall be voidable at the option of the Seller upon written notice. Seller agrees to pay up to
tt to exceed $

- -

. In addition, seller agrees to pay $ *—

<rTl

^

—'

days a f t e r Seller's acceptance

'—'' —

to be used for Buyer's other loan costs.

C^:. :=-.

mortgage loan discount

ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT
This ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER constitutes:

( ) a COUNTER OFFER

SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT) dated the _ Z _ ^ _ L day of

/;'ck\

tt>*£4i&eq
~^£<^A/^>

A/P (/

i g f f / , between

±&&Jd-J±r'

i^Ta^^^lX.

buyer(s) and

covering real property described as*iettows:

( l ^ a n ADDENDUM to that EARNEST MONEY

—

^-.?*~

/

assel(er(s),
.<r:^,

^

*zz>^.',;)<=. ^Ufe. ^ > » ^ / ^ ^ - . &,iy. t-firr

The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of THE AGREEMENT:

*0 // Muss UTil^^/uk
/-fJ ^ffi^Ut £>?!
a? A^:^ -cp ~LISZA/AJ MSJ&&G. $&&#<4£ / ^ ^ e -

f

J fxtHcri/£^

- p^\

*A.^<4>£K

"

•—;

;

<J'rr*'i LQ^AX / ? - / r

1

-

"TO *IT*JLJL

-^y

V- ^-P/* '*> ^QP u i~

~

All other terms of THE AGREEMENT shall remain the same. W Seller.jggTBuyer shall have until
•' /
Date

19

H

?

r

—"

(A.M./P.M.)

.L, to accept the terms specified above. Unless so accepted this Addendum shall lapse.

;

Time

Signature, of ( ) Seller ( v^Buyer
(A.M./P.M.)

^.-•'
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTER

s*y ^r^^j^<^\

'- ^r

OFFER/REJECTION

Check One
(
(

) I hereby ACCEPT the foregoing on the terms specified above.
) I hereby ACCEPT the foregoing SUBJECT TO the exceptions shown on the attached Addendum.

(

Signature
) I hereby reject the foregoing

(

) I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing all signatures.

Signature
(Initials)

Date

Time

DOCUMENT RECEIPT

Signature of Buyer(s)
(
1

Date

Signature of Seller(s)

) I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing bearing appropriate signatures to be mailed on
9

Sent by

. by Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer.

Date

, <

,es and exceptions noted herein, evidenced by
current policy of title insurance in the amount of purchase price D an abstract of title brought current.
fs opinion (See Section H).
ION OF TITLE. In accordance with Section G, Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subject property prior to dosing. Buyer shad take title
! - " w e x j 5 t j n g restrictive covenants, including condominium restrictions (CC & R's). Buyer U has U has not reviewed any condominium CC & R's prior tpsjgning this Agreement.
1NG OF TITLE. Title shall vest in Buyer as follows:
^ ' i ZJJ-*S/£ JT^7^> A-T^ / /AV/^ / / ^ sjr>/ls:^
/A/.\L

^f^U^rfZ

^ELLERS WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the foliowingjtems are also warranted:

f

/'V

'?\\/K

ti the above and Section C shall be limited to the following:
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES. This offer is made subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which must be satisfied
0 dosingL/'

-—•• < ^

S—<z—

/ r~

JC-

'J*-r.*4-

L.'C- *'!.(-/

«^>Y-

f^-c^>f/'&<"&
/ir/,)
'fA/Tir?*'

J-£

•r-A/
V**-7ji*.*J.,ls

• ! / > < < >

•--<"
*.-,
<-r/ <&
CLOSING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be closed on or before

>*-/ - A 1 / 't':
,19.! ^
a reasonable location to be designated by
, subject to Section Q. Upon demand, Buyer shall deposit with the escrow closing office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance with
jreement. Prorations set forth in Section R shall be made as of

• date of possession {pdate of closing • other

POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on £J>-!

r

K/

f.Z/^•fj.jxJp

AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing_of this Agreement the listing agent
e selling agent.

- ^ '?*"£!S A / l ^ — *

(Sunless extended by written agreement of parties.

V/C-

< ^ / / . / r ^ - / ^ » J-JL_

represents (^fSeller ( ) Buyer.

represents ( ) Seller (IS) Buyer. Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this Agreement

i disclosure of the agency relationships) was provided to him/her. t " ^ p ) (-'/TBuyer's initials (

)(

) Seller's initials.

SENERAL PROVISIONS. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ABOVE, THE GENERAL PROVISION SECTIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE BEEN
AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller shall
LfAM/PM).
mtil s±
X to the^BuyeC
,-

77/4._-.t""

's Signature)

lAlwi

..19.

, to accept this offer. Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the EARNEST

.• —./ / - ' /

" "" £

H it ' if -"^

(Date) -

**•
's Signature)

. •• ' r r
(Address)

~O

J-i'~l

:

- .'.' ~ Y(Phone)

_ " * • • " '

•

•

—

*

.

(SSN/TAX ID)

*/

Pate)

(Address)

(Phone)

(SSN/TAX ID)

<ONE
JCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above.
EJECTION. Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer

(Seller's initials)

)UNTER OFFER. Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the attached Addendum, and
ants said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance. Buyer shall have until
ified below.

(AM/PM)

, 19

to accept the terms

s Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Address)

(Phone)

(SSN/TAX ID)

s Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Address)

(Phone)

(SSN/TAX ID)

CONE:
CEPTANCE OF COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER
JECTION. Buyer hereby REJECTS the COUNTER OFFER.

(Buyer's Initials)

HUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER with modifications on attached Addendum.

s Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Buyer's Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

DOCUMENT RECEIPT
> Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures. (One of the following alternatives must therefore be completed).
J I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures:

iRE
.«<? OF
~>«SELLER

SIGNATURE OF BUYER

*?-••—
Date

Oat*

J I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed on.
d Mail and return receipt attached hereto to th« D Seller • Buyer. Sent by
h r e e Of m f o u r omam f o r m

.19.

-by

i r her authority to do sp and to bind Buyer or Seller.
COMPLETE AGREEMENT — NO ORAL AGREEMENTS. This instrument constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes and cancels any
I afl poor negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties. There are no oral agreements which modify or affect this agreett. This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties.
L COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be in writing and. if attached hereto, shall incorporate all the provisions of this Agreement
expressly modified or excluded therein.
. DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer, Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages
i institute suit to enforce any rights of Seller. In the event of default by Seller, or it this sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction of any express condition
ontingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit shall be returned to
er. Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses,
jding a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by apible law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise. In the event the principal broker holding the earnest money deposit is required to file an inleader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit referred to herein, the Buyer and Seller authorize the principal broker to draw from the
test money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action. The amount of deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall
iterpleaded into court in accordance with state law. The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting party shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney's
incurred by the principal broker in bringing such action.
ABROGATION. Except for express warranties made in this Agreement, execution and delivery of final closing documents shall abrogate this Agreement.
RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing. In the event there is loss or damage to the property between
late hereof and the date of closing, by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God, and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed ten percent
B) of the purchase price of the property. Buyer may at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees in writing to repair or replace damaged property
to dosing or declare this Agreement null and void. If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price and Seller agrees in writing to repair
place and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction shall proceed as agreed.
TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport, strikes,
lood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, delays caused by lender, acts of God, or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the closing
shall be extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than fifteen (15) days beyond the closing date provided herein. Thereafter,
is of the essence. This provision relates only to the extension of closing dates. "Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed and
sred by all parties to the transaction.
CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (1/2) of the escrow closing fee, unless otherwise required by the lending institution. Costs of providing
nsurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller. Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the Buyer, rents, and interest
isumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8. Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves shall be assigned to Buyer
>sing.
REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING. If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than those ex»d herein. If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract. Seller may transfer by either (a) special warranty deed,
lining Seller's assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the said existing real
i contract therein.
NOTICE. Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, any notice expressly required by it must be given no later than two days after the occurrence or non-occurrence
( event with respect to which notice is required. If any such timely required notice is not given, the contingency with respect to which the notice was to be given
omaticaily terminated and this Agreement is in full force and effect. If a person other than the Buyer or the Seller is designated to receive notice on behalf of the
- or the Seller, notice to the person so designated shall be considered notice to the party designating that person for receipt of notice.
BROKERAGE. For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, "Brokerage" shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office.
DAYS. For the purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, "days" shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays.

; FOUR OF A FOUR PAGE FORM.

J FORM HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL — JULY 1f 1987

DENNIS R. JAMES, No. 1642
MITCHEL T. RICE, No. 6022
MORGAN & HANSEN
Attorneys for Spectrum Development Corporation
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-7888
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FARRELL G. and VICKI A.
FORSBERG,

DEFENDANT SPECTRUM
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION'S
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES
REGARDING IMPLIED WARRANTY
OF HABITABILITY

Plaintiffs,
V.

BURNINGHAM & KIMBALL, a
Utah general partnership,
CHRISTENSEN & KIMBALL,
a Utah general partnership,
as partner of Burningham S
Kimball; VICTOR M. KIMBALL,
individually and as general
partner of Christensen &
Kimball; SPECTRUM DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, as partner of
Burningham & Kimball,

Civil No. 90-0906667CN

Judge Michael R. Murphy
Defendants.
SPECTRUM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a Utah corporation,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
v.
NEIL'S HEATING & AIR CONDITIONING, a Utah corporation,
and RANDY TIMOTHY PAINTING,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Third-Party Defendants.

7VT">T»T?x"Tr>-r,\r

Defendant Spectrum Development Corporation, by and through its
attorney, Dennis R. James of Morgan & Hansen, and pursuant to
invitation of the Court by Minute Entry dated July 22, 1992,
submits

the

following

Memorandum

of

Points

and

Authorities

addressing the applicability of Wade v. Jobe. 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah
1991) to the case at hand.
ARGUMENT
A.

There is not even the slightest hint in the language of Wade
v. Jobe that the Court considered the warranty of habitability
to be applicable in the real property area beyond residential
leases.
It would require a "quantum jump" to draw the presumption that

the Utah Supreme Court, by

adopting an implied warranty

of

habitability theory in landlord/tenant law, intended this theory of
law to also be applied to the purchase of new homes from a
builder/vendor.

The Utah Supreme Court made it perfectly clear

that they were adopting a theory applicable only to residential
leases.

By footnote, the Court indicated that it was not even

extending the common law implied warranty of habitability to
commercial leases, let alone making the even greater jump required
to make the theory applicable to the purchase of new homes from a
builder/vendor.
2.

Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, page 1010, footnote

There has been no suggestion that the 40 states that have

adopted the warranty of habitability theory, either legislatively
or judicially, in the area of landlord/tenant law, have seen fit to
expand that theory into the realm of new home purchases.
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B.

Plaintiffs have not brought the appropriate case before this
Court for consideration of expanding the implied warranty of
habitability into the area of new home purchases.
Even if there was some correlation between the states that

have adopted the warranty of habitability in the landlord/tenant
area and the states that have adopted the warranty of habitability
in the new construction area, Plaintiffs have simply not brought
the appropriate case before this Court for the requested expansion
of the law. While Plaintiffs espouse that, in spite of the lack of
"cost-effectiveness" of their case, they are pursuing a worthy
principle which transcends economic realities, our common law is
still developed on a case by case approach.

Even though one

believes that a new legal theory is worthy of adoption in Utah, the
courts must await a case with the right facts in order to consider
such an expansion of the law.
In Wade v. Jobe. the Utah Supreme Court was handed a most
appropriate case for the adoption of the warranty of habitability
theory in the area of landlord/tenant law.

In that case, we have

a single mother with three young children who, within a few days of
taking occupancy, had no hot water. An investigation revealed that
the lack of hot water was the result of the flame of the water
heater having been extinguished by accumulated sewage and water in
the basement, which produced a foul odor throughout the house. The
landlord, upon being notified of the problem, pumped the sewage and
water from the basement onto the sidewalk, never solving the
problem.
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An inspection by the Ogden City Inspection Division
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revealed that the premises were unsafe for human occupancy due to
the lack of a sewer connection and other problems.

The Division

found numerous code violations which were a substantial hazard to
the health and safety of the occupants.

The Division issued a

notice that the property would be condemned if the violations were
not

remedied.

The landlord's treatment

offensive to human sensitivities.

of his tenants was

After the tenant moved out of

the house, the landlord had the gall to bring suit to recover the
unpaid rent, thereby inviting the Court to find a legal theory to
protect this defenseless tenant from the egregious behavior of this
overreaching landlord calloused to human sensitivities and with no
regard for the health or safety of this woman and her three
children.
Given those facts, the Court adopted an implied warranty of
habitability theory with respect to residential leases based upon
the following factors:
1.

The rule of caveat emptor assumes an equal bargaining

position between landlord and tenant. Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006,
p. 1010.
2.

Modern

tenants,

like

consumers

of

goods,

however,

frequently have no choice but to rely on the landlord to provide a
habitable dwelling.
3.

Id.

Where they exist, housing shortages, standardized leases

and racial and class discrimination place today's tenants, as
consumers of housing, in a poor position to bargain effectively for
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express warranties and covenants, requiring landlord to lease and
maintain safe and sanitary housing.
4,

Id.

In consumer law, implied warranties are designed to

protect ordinary consumers who do not have the knowledge, capacity,
or opportunity to insure that goods which they are buying are in
safe condition.
5.

Id.

The implied warranty of habitability has been adopted in

other jurisdictions to protect the tenant as the party in the less
advantageous bargaining position.

Id.

Recognizing that these were the bases relied upon by the Court
for the adoption of the theory of implied warranty of habitability
in the landlord/tenant area of the law, we must first analyze
whether the facts of our case warrant the Court's consideration of
the expansion of that theory into the area of purchases of new
homes.

The answer is a resounding "no" based upon the following

facts:
1.

The facts are clear that the Plaintiffs were in a strong

bargaining position with respect to the purchase of this home.
They bargained the price down from $260,000 to $235,000 and then
bargained an additional $8,475 in credits. Plaintiffs were able to
demand completion of an extremely detailed punch list of items by
the Seller.

Plaintiffs had many houses to choose from and there

was no testimony that they were under any pressure to purchase this
particular home.

Plaintiffs were represented by a real estate

agent with ten years' experience
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(who, in spite of contrary

assertions by counsel for Plaintiffs in his closing argument,
clearly represented the Plaintiffs, as specifically indicated in
Item 10, Agency Disclosure, of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement,
Exhibit 28) . Plaintiffs had Brent Toolson, who had both experience
and education in the contracting industry, walk through and inspect
the home.
2.

Instead of a situation in which buyers are left without

warranty due to the common law merger doctrine upon closing and
execution

of

the warranty

deed, the

Plaintiffs

specifically

negotiated a one-year builder's warranty on the entire home.

By

the very terms of Section 0 of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement,
this and any other express warranties survived the execution and
delivery of final closing documents.
The entire basis for the Utah Supreme Court's adoption of the
implied warranty of habitability in the landlord/tenant area is
missing with respect to the case at hand. There was no evidence of
a disparity of bargaining position unless it was disparity in favor
of Plaintiffs who were taking advantage of an anxious seller.
There was no evidence of housing shortages forcing Plaintiffs to
either take this home or go without shelter. There was no evidence
that any warranty proposed by Plaintiffs in their offer had been
rejected or crossed out by Seller.

There was no evidence that

Plaintiffs were forced to use a standardized Earnest Money Sales
Agreement in making their offer or that they were prevented, or
even pressured, from completing it and the Addendum in accordance
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with their own desires and in accordance with the advice of their
real estate agent.

There is simply no evidence that Plaintiffs

were in a poor position

to bargain effectively

for express

warranties and covenants.

The detailed punch list requirements,

the required $8,475 in credits, and the specific inclusion of the
one-year builder's warranty are all facts running counter to the
Utah Supreme Court's basis for their decision in Wade v. Jobe.
C

Plaintiffs* inclusion of an express one-year builder's
warranty excluded the possibility of them benefitting, in
addition, from an implied warranty covering the same subject
matter.
The Utah Court of Appeals in Ted R. Brown and Assoc, v. Carnes

Corp. , 753 P.2d 964, 970 (Utah App. 1988) citing the earlier Utah
Supreme Court ruling in Rio Alaom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d
497, 505 (Utah 1980) stated that "an express agreement or covenant
relating to a specific contract right excludes the possibility of
an implied covenant of a different or contradictory nature." The
Court of Appeals, citing 3 Corbin on Contracts § 564 (1960) ,
further solidified this position by stating, "[w]here the parties
have made an express contract, the court should not find a
different one by 'implication1 concerning the same subject matter
if the evidence does not justify [such] an interference . . . " Ted
R. Brown and Assoc, v. Carnes Corp. at 970.
Plaintiffs included an express one-year builders1 warranty in
their offer, which was accepted by the Seller. They now are asking
this Court to expand their warranty rights far beyond what they
proposed and bargained for in their contract. The granting of such
wp51\drj\4103f.ine!n
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a request would violate the very rule of law of this State set
forth by the Supreme Court in Alaom Corp, v. Jimco Ltd,

This is

not an appropriate case to even consider expanding the implied
warranty of habitability theory into the realm of sales of newly
constructed homes.
D.

The tests adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in Wade v. Jobe
were not breached by the Defendants.
The Utah Supreme Court in Wade v. Jobe stated, "As a general

rule, the warranty of habitability requires that the landlord
maintain 'bare living requirements1. . . and that the premises are
fit for human occupation."

Id. 1010-11.

Plaintiffs, in the case

at hand, were never forced to seek alternative shelter.

They did

eat out for a meal or two when they were without water because of
the frozen pipes, but nothing more. There is no evidence that the
home failed to meet the bare living requirements or that it was not
fit for human occupation. It is noteworthy that the need for paint
was specifically excluded by the Court as a requirement.
The Court indicated that substantial compliance with building
and housing code standards would generally serve as evidence of the
fulfillment of the landlord's duty to provide habitable premises.
Id, 1011. The evidence in the case at hand is that the construction met all code requirements and passed all inspections.

There

was not even a citation issued in connection with Salt Lake City's
investigation of the frozen pipes.

The Court did indicate that

there could be a breach of the warranty even though there was no
code violation if the claimed defect had an impact on the health or
wp51\drj\4103f.mem
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safety of the tenant. Id. There is simply no evidence in the case
at hand that the health or safety of the Plaintiffs was ever in
question as a result of the alleged defects for which they seek
reimbursement.
Most importantly, the Court set forth the requirement that the
landlord must have a reasonable time to repair material defects
before a breach can be established.

Id. 1010.

This requirement

alone, which, in all fairness would necessarily be a requirement if
the warranty of habit ability were expanded to the purchase of new
homes, would bar Plaintiffs1 recovery.

Plaintiffs never provided

the Defendants or the Third-Party Defendants any notice, demand, or
opportunity to cure the alleged defects.
E.

The facts of this case do not warrant the Court's interference
with the sanctity of the parties1 contract.
Even with full deference to the Utah Supreme Court's adoption

of the warranty of habitability in the landlord/tenant area in Wade
v. Jobe, the courts of this State are duty bound to uphold the
sanctity of the parties1

contract.

The Utah Supreme Court

reiterated the fundamental right of the parties to contract freely
on terms which establish and allocate risks between them in
Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985)
by stating:
With a few exceptions, it is still axiomatic in
contract law that persons dealing at arm's length are
entitled to contract on their own terms without the
intervention of the courts for the purpose of relieving
one side or the other from the effects of a bad bargain.
Parties should be permitted to enter into contracts that
actually may be unreasonable or which may lead to
wp51\drj\4103f.mem
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hardship on one side.
Although courts will not be
parties to enforcing flagrantly unjust agreements, it is
not for the courts to assume the paternalistic role of
declaring that one who has freely bound himself need not
perform because the bargain is not favorable.
Id. at 1040 (citations omitted).
The Court went on to discuss unconscionability as an exception
to these general principles.

However, we are not dealing in the

case at hand with an unconscionable contract. Plaintiffs chose to
use the standardized Earnest Money Sales Agreement as the vehicle
to

present

their

offer.

Plaintiffs

drafted

the

Addendum.

Plaintiffs filled in the blank spaces of the Earnest Money Sales
Agreement.

Plaintiffs proposed the terms of sale.

Plaintiffs

required the one-year builder's warranty.
There is no evidence of fraud or concealment of known defects.
There is no evidence of a failure to disclose dangerous conditions.
There is no gross disparity of bargaining positions requiring a
reapportioning of responsibility in spite of the contract terms.
F.

Plaintiffs, with the exception of the one-year builders1
warranty and the warranties set forth in Section C of the
Earnest Money Sales Agreement (Ex. 28), expressly accepted the
property "as is."
Plaintiffs, by the terms of their own document, accepted the

property in "as is" condition. The law of this state with respect
to that provision is set forth in Tibbets v. Ooenshaw, 18 Utah 2d
442,

425 P.2d 160 (1967), in which the court upheld a lower court

ruling that an "as is" provision in a real estate contract was
effective to disclaim any potential implied warranties. There, as
here, the "as is" provision is controlling because the Plaintiffs
wp51\drj\4103f.roem
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have failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that such was
not the understanding of the parties at the time the contract was
entered into,

Id. at 161-62. A party cannot sign a contract and

thereafter assert ignorance or failure to read the contract as a
defense to its enforcement.

John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti

City Corp. , 743 P.2d 1205, appeal after remand 795 P.2d 678.
Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc.,
706 P.2d 1028.
Plaintiffs argue that not all of the preprinted terms of the
Earnest Money Sales Agreement apply to the case at hand.

On this

ground they seek the Court's help in relieving them of their
agreement to accept the property in "as is" condition subject to
Sellerfs warranties as outlined in Section 6 of the Earnest Money
Sales Agreement.

It is interesting to note that it was in Section

6 that Plaintiffs added the requirement of a one-year builder's
warranty.

It seems obvious that Plaintiffs' real estate agent,

knowing of the "as is" provision, saw the need to include an
express one-year builder's warranty on the entire home.
Plaintiffs' counsel, in his closing argument, specifically
referenced Section C on page 1 of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, calling the Court's attention to the reference to air
conditioning and asking whether the Seller wants to be bound to
such a warranty in light of the fact that the home, as originally
constructed, had no air conditioner.

This matter was, of course,

resolved at closing by Exhibit 79 in which the Plaintiffs specifi-
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cally agreed to undertake the installation of the air conditioner
and to release Sellers in connection therewith.

Parties to a

contract may, by mutual consent, modify any or all of a contract
and the terms of the modification prevail over inconsistent terms
in the original contract. Ted R. Brown and Assoc, v. Carnes Corp.,
753 P.2d 964, 968 (Utah App. 1988).
More importantly, the fact that a term or a phrase or even a
section of a contract is inapplicable does not render unenforceable
another section of the contract that is clear, unambiguous, and
applicable. Common sense and good faith are the leading characteristics of all constructions of contracts.

Contracts must receive

a reasonable construction according to the intention of the parties
at the time of executing them, if that intention can be ascertained
from their language.

A reasonable construction will be preferred

to one which is unreasonable, and that interpretation should be
adopted which, under all the circumstances of the case, ascribes
the most reasonable, probable, and natural conduct of the parties.
17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts, §§ 340, 342, 344.
It is fundamental that doubtful language in a contract should
be interpreted most strongly against the party who has selected
that language, especially where he seeks to use such language to
defeat the contract or its operation, unless the use of such
language is prescribed by law.

Also, in case of doubt or ambigu-

ity, a contract will be construed most strongly against the party
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whose attorney drew or prepared it.

Id. § 348 (emphasis added) .

Although the rule is well settled that written or typed
provisions, when there is an inconsistency, are given greater
effect than the printed parts, there is no suggestion by that rule
that printed parts are not enforceable. Id. § 395. Printed parts
are controlling absent such inconsistency with written or typed
parts.
SUMMARY
Plaintiffs have not presented to this Court a case which cries
out for the expansion of the implied warranty of habitability
theory to new construction home sales at the expense of the
sanctity of the contractual rights of the parties.
"sewage in the basement" case.

This is not a

This is not a case in which the

"big bad builder" forced unconscionable contractual terms on the
"poor innocent purchaser" or refused to give express warranties
with respect to the construction of the home.

This is not a case

in which the "big bad builder" chose to ignore the repeated demands
of the "poor innocent purchaser." Plaintiffs1 first written demand
was this lawsuit, commenced several years after the fact, with no
opportunity for the contractor or any subcontractor to remedy or
cure.
This is not the case that screams for the Court to step into
the legislative arena, no matter how strong the desire may be to
see this theory of liability adopted in the State of Utah.
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1 HAROLD A. HINTZE (A-1499)

GARDINER & HINTZE
2 525 E a s t 100 S o u t h , S u i t e 200
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84102
T
elephone:
(801) 3 5 5 - 7 9 0 0
3

4

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

5

STATE OF UTAH

6
G. and VICKI A.
7 FARRELL
FORSBERG,

8

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,

9
10

vs.
BURNINGHAM & KIMBALL, a Utah

11 general partnership, et al.,
12

Civil No. 9009066667

Defendants.

13
SPECTRUM DEVELOPMENT

14 CORPORATION, a Utah
15

corporation,
Third-Party Plaintiff,

16
17

vs.
NEIL'S HEATING & AIR

18 CONDITIONING, a Utah
19
20
21

corporation, et al.,
Third-Party Defendants.
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys and pursuant to

22 Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) and the directions of this Court
23 at a hearing held on July 31, 1992, hereby respectfully submit
24 their proposed FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW as to those
25! issues addressed by the Court.
26
27|
28

APPENDIX 4

1

GENERAL

2

1.

Plaintiffs are residents of Salt Lake County, State of

3 Utah. The contract herein sued upon arose and was to be performed
4 within said county and state.
5

2.

The Defendant CHRISTENSEN & KIMBALL, is a Utah general

6 partnership with its principal place of business in Salt Lake
7 County, State of Utah. Defendant VICTOR M. KIMBALL is a resident
8 of and is doing business within Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
9 The

Defendant

SPECTRUM

DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION

is

a

Utah

101 corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake
11 County, State of Utah.

121

3.

Pursuant to an open court Stipulation entered into the

13 record at the commencement of trial, the Defendants are jointly and
14 severally liable for the damages found herein.
15

4.

On or about November 17, 1987, the Forsbergs, as buyers,

161 and Defendant, CHRISTENSEN & KIMBALL, as sellers, entered into a
17 Earnest Money Sales Agreement whereby the Forsbergs bought from the
18 Defendants a home located at 2364 South Scenic Drive, Salt Lake
19 City, Utah. Said home is more particularly described as Yard 105,

201 Benchmark Subdivision.
21

5.

(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 28.)

Said Earnest Money Sales Agreement contained, inter alia.

221 the following express warranty and representation:
"Seller to give a one-year builder's warranty on entire
home.w

23
24

(Exhibit 28, p. 6.)

25
26
27
28

6.

During the spring of 1988, after the Forsbergs moved into

the subject home, it was discovered that the ground floor of the

1 home leaked and permitted substantial amounts of water to enter and

2 flood said floor.
3

7.

During the spring of 1988, the paint on the railings and

4 deck of the home flaked off and required substantial repair,
5i including sanding, sealing and repainting.

8.

6

During the night of February 3, 1989, the water pipes

7 within the home froze and burst causing severe water damage to the
8 home and necessitating substantial repair.
9.

9

10 difficulty

The

interior

of

the

home

experienced

substantial

in maintaining adequate heat and air conditioning,

11 ultimately requiring an additional furnace and air conditioning
12 unit to be added to the home.
YARD MISREPRESENTATION

13
10.

14

As part of the Defendants' efforts to sell the home, the

15 Defendants' realtor prepared a document entitled "FACT SHEET"
16 purporting to state relevant information about the home and yard
M
/M
17 size. According to said FACT SHEET, the yard size was 98' x 102

18 and

described

as

a

"flat

backyard

with

room

for

a pool."

19 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 27.)
20

11.. The Defendants also misrepresented the size of the yard

21 by planting poplar trees as a site barrier between the subject home
221 site and the GMAC building located to the west of the property.
23! Said trees were beyond the actual property lines.

(Plaintiffs'

24 Exhibits 34, 35, 75-D.)
25

26J
27
28

12.

The Forsbergs reasonably relied upon the representations

of the Defendants relative to the size of the property.

There was

1 no notice whatsoever at the closing as to the size of the property

2 of the location of easements restricting the utility of the yard.
3|

13.

The property, as represented by the Defendants, would

4 contain 9,996 sq. ft.

The actual size of the property is

5 approximately 4,628 sq. ft. The fair market value of the property,
61 as indicated by the Defendants own testimony, is the sum of $3.85
7; per sq. ft. and the Plaintiffs thereby incurred damages as a direct

8j and proximate result of the Defendants' negligent misrepresentation

9 in the sum of $21,767.90.
10|

1988 BASEMENT FLOODING

11

(Express Warranty)

121

13J

14.

The Court finds that the home was not built in a workman-

like manner sufficient to keep it water tight and as a result

14 thereof, the home experienced flooding during the spring of 1988.
15 Such defect is covered by the one-year builders warranty provided

16] by the Defendants.
17

15.

There was no credible evidence that there was any soils

18 testing prior to construction of the home, even though there is no

191 evidence of the source of the water nor evidence of any building
20! code violations.
21

16.

Plaintiffs are entitled to those damages which are

22! reasonably required to repair and to put the home in the condition
23 as it should have been at the time of possession.

Those damages

24 are reflected in Exhibits 71-73 and Exhibit 64, plus a total of
25 $450 attributable to time spent by Dr. Forsberg for a total of
26
27
28

1 $10,591.21.

Said

sums

were

necessarily

incurred

and

are

2 reasonable.
3;

DEFECTIVE PAINTING OF DECKS AND RAILS

4

(Express Warranty)

51

17.

The Court finds that the railing and decks were not

6 painted in a workman-like manner. Said defect is covered by the
7 one-year builders warranty provided by the Defendants.
8|
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18.

The

cost

to

repair

said

defect

is

reflected

in

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 44 and is the sum of $3,049.00 which the Court

101 finds reasonable and necessary.
11

(FEBRUARY 3. 1989 - FROZEN PIPE-FLOOD)

12]

(Express Warranty)

13

19.

The Court finds that the house was not built in a

14 workman-like manner as to its framing and insulation thereby
15 causing or permitting the water pipes within the home to freeze and

161 burst during a severe cold experienced during the night of February
17 3, 1989. The Court finds, however, that said occurrence was beyond
18 the express one-year warranty provided by the Defendants.
19

20.

The

Court

does

find, however,

that

the

Plaintiffs

20| incurred damages as a result of said incident in the sum of
21 $5,169.92 as indicated in Exhibits P-46; P-57-62; P-66-70 all of

221 which were necessarily incurred and are reasonable.
COLLATERAL SOURCE

23
24

21.

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs made a claim upon

25 their home-owners insurance for the damages sustained as a result
26 of the ruptured water pipes and resultant repairs and received from
27
28

1 said

insurance

the

sum

of

$6,036.42

(which

claim

included

2 additional items withdrawn as claims asserted herein.) As a result
3 of receipt of said insurance proceeds, the Plaintiffs incurred no
4 compensable damages as a result of the ruptured water pipes.
5
61

MITIGATION
22.

The Plaintiffs are not barred from recovery by a failure

7 to mitigate their damages by requesting that the Defendants, or
8| Defendants' subcontractors return to the premises to do the
necessary repair work.

The Court finds that such a request would

10| have been a meaningless act and the evidence indicates that such
11 requests to Defendants brought no response.

121

ESCROW

13|

$1,000

14

23.

The $1,000 to be held in escrow pursuant to the closing

15 documents (but erroneously not held by the title company) was

161 intended as "security", in effect, for the completion of the "punch
17 list" items shown on Exhibit P-84.

No line item amounts are

18] provided as to each entry and Plaintiffs did not proffer evidence
19 as to each uncompleted item, or the value thereof.

Accordingly,

201 the Court finds "no cause of action" as to the escrow claim.
21

ADEQUATE HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING

221

(Express Warranty)

23

24.

Pursuant to the closing documents, the Defendants were

24 responsible for providing the home with an adequate heating system.
25 In that regard, the Defendants failed to install or select
26 properly, in a workman-like fashion an adequate heating system. On
27
28

1 that issue, the Court discredits the testimony of Steve Sundloff

2 and Bill Thompson and credits the testimony of Mr. Norton.
25.

3

On this issue, the court finds that the Plaintiffs have

4; failed in their burden of proof.
5

!

26.

with respect to the air conditioning, the Court finds

6 that, in accordance with the closing documents, said obligation
7 remained with the Plaintiffs as evidenced by Exhibits P-79 & P-74,
8 and the Defendants are not liable on that issue under any theory.
9
101

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court has subject matter and personal jurisdiction in

11 this case.
12

2.

Pursuant to Stipulation, the Defendants are jointly and

13 severally liable for the damages sustained by the Plaintiffs and
14 for the Judgment to be issued pursuant to these Findings and
15 Conclusions.
YARD MISREPRESENTATION

16
17

3.

Utah

has

adopted

the Restatement

of

Tort

2d

§552

18 regarding negligent misrepresentation and Restatement of Torts 2d
19 §538a. A vendor is liable in tort for misrepresentations as to the
20 area of land conveyed, notwithstanding such misrepresentations were
21 made without actual knowledge of their falsity. The reason is that

221 parties

to a real estate transaction do not deal on equal terms.

231 An owner is presumed to know the boundaries of his own land and the
24 quantity

of his acreage.

25 information,

he

must

If he does not know the correct

find

out

or

refrain

from

making

261 representations to unsuspecting strangers. Even honesty in making
27
28!

Ilia mistake is no defense as it is incumbent upon the vendor to know
2 the facts.
3||

4.

(Duaan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1249 (Utah 1980))

The

parol

evidence rule

411 negligent misrepresentation.

does

not

bar

evidence of

(Formento v. Encanto Business Park,

5 744 P.2d 22 (Arizona 1987))
6

5.

The integration clause of the Earnest Money Agreement is

7 not applicable in an action based upon negligent misrepresentation.
8

6.

Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the Defendants

9 based upon the theory of negligent misrepresentation in the amount
10 of $21,769.90.
11

ONE-YEAR BUILDERS

12

(Express Warranty)

13

7.

14 breach

The flooding which occurred in the spring of 1988 was a
of

the

one-year

builders

warranty

provided

by

the

15 Defendants.
16

8.

As a result of said breach, the Plaintiffs are entitled

17 to a judgment against the Defendants in the sum of $10,591.21.
18

9.

The peeling paint on the exterior rails and decks which

19 occurred in the spring of 1988 was a breach of the one-year
20 builders warranty provided by the Defendants.
21

10. As a result of said breach, the Plaintiffs are entitled

22 to a judgment against the Defendants in the sum of $3,059.00.
23

11.

The ruptured water pipes which occurred on February 4,

24 1989 was an incident beyond the one-year warranty and, therefore,
25 is not actionable under the express warranty by the Plaintiffs.

26
27
28

1
2

IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
12.

The Court finds and adopts the principal that in Utah

3 there exists an implied warranty of habitability in favor of buyers
4 of new homes. A purchase of a home is the most significant single
5 purchase in most individuals' lives and no adequate tort claim
6 otherwise exists which would protect said buyers from latent
7 defects existing within the home.
8

13.

Said warranty is limited to "latent1' defects.

9

14.

Said warranty is further limited to the concept of

101 •'habitability"

and

is

not

applicable

to

the

concept

of

11 "merchantability" or "adequate workmanship."
121

15.

Because the warranty of habitability is a creature of

131 public policy,

it

generally

cannot

be

waived,

such

waivers

14 themselves being against public policy. In order for a warranty to
15 exist their must be a conspicuous reference to the warranty within
16i the contract, consciously understood and agreed to by the parties.
17

16.

In this particular case, the "one-year builders warranty"

18 created an express warranty which waived any claim of implied
191 warranty.
IMPLIED WARRANTY

201
21

17.

As to the flooding within the home in the Spring of 1988,

221 the Court finds that said flooding was the result of the
23 Defendants' failure to build the home in a workman-like manner,
24 causing a latent defect in the home.
25

18.

The flooding of the home did not, however, render the

26 home "uninhabitable."
27
28

1

19.

As to the frozen and ruptured water pipes in February,

2 1989, the Court finds that said damage occurred as a result of the
3 Defendants' failure to build the home in a workman-like manner,
4 causing a latent defect in the home.
5
20. The broken water pipes did not, however, render the home
6 "uninhabitable."
7

21.

The paint flaking and peeling off the exterior rails and

8 deck was the result of the Defendants' failure to build the home in
9 a workman-like manner, causing a latent defect in the home.

io|

22.

The peeling paint did not, however, render the home

11 "uninhabitable."

121

DATED this

day of October, 1992.

131

BY THE COURT:

14

15j
Honorable Michael R. Murphy
District Court Judge

16|
17i
18
19

201
21

221

231
24!
25
26
27
28

10

1

2
3

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
WITH CJA 4-504(2)
Plaintiffs certify that a copy of the Plaintiffs' Proposed

4 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was mailed to counsel for
5 the Defendants listed below more than five (5) days prior to
6 submission to the Court in accordance with CJA 4-504(2).
7
8
9
101
11
12
13

Dennis R. James, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendant Spectrum
Development Corporation
Morgan & Hansen
136 South Main, #800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Duane Smith, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendants
Christensen & Kimball, and
Victor M. Kimball
Dart, Adamson & Kasting
310 South Main, #1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

14
15
16

Harold A, Hintze
Attorney for Plaintiffs

17
18

19|
20
21
22
23
24

25]
26
27
28
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Dennis R. James, No. 1642
MORGAN & HANSEN
Attorney for Defendant Spectrum Development
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-7888
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
FARRELL G. and VICKI A.
FORSBERG,

]1
jI
I
i

Plaintiffs,

DEFENDANT SPECTRUM DEVELOPMENT' S
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS'
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
BURNINGHAM & KIMBALL, a Utah
general partnership, et al.,
Defendants.
SPECTRUM DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation,

i

Civil NO. 9009066667

i

Judge Michael R. Murphy

]

Third-party
Plaintiff,

]

vs.
NEIL'S HEATING & AIR
CONDITIONING, a Utah
corporation, et al.,

]
]

Third-party
Defendants.
Defendant

]

Spectrum

Development,

by

and through

its

attorney Dennis R. James of Morgan & Hansen, hereby objects to

APPENDIX R

Plaintiffs1 Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as set
forth below:
1.
Findings

of

With respect to Paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs » Proposed
Fact,

Plaintiffs'

set

forth

what

amounts

to a

conclusion of law that was never found by the Court and is
completely contrary to any legal authority.

There was no finding

of fact or conclusion of law by the Court that the statement in the
Earnest Money Sales Agreement, Section 6,

"Seller to give a one-

year builder's warranty on entire home," constituted an express
warranty or representation.

On its face, this statement simply

indicates that at some point in time in the future, presumably at
closing, seller would give to buyer some format of a one year
builder's warranty.

The language is not otherwise operative.

In Groen v. Tri-O-Inc. , 667 P.2d 598
(emphasis

added),

the Utah

(Utah 1983) at p. 604

Supreme Court defined

an express

warranty as follows:
"A warranty is an assurance by one party to a
contract of the existence of a fact upon which
the other party may rely. It is intended to
relieve the promisee of any duty to ascertain
the fact for himself and it amounts to a
promise to answer in damages for any injury
proximately caused if the fact warranted
proves untrue."
With respect to the statement "Seller to give a one-year
builder's warranty on entire home", there is simply no statement or
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assurance of the existence of a fact.

it is a prospective

statement without any specifics as to what might be warranted or
what standard might be applied. What Plaintiffs now want the Court
to do is to rewrite the agreement so that seller expressly warrants
the entire home to be constructed in a workmanlike manner.
Plaintiffs only possible cause of action with respect to
the statement "Seller to give a one-year builder's warranty on an
entire home" would be a breach of contract claim for failing to
provide the warranty Plaintiffs expected would be provided at
closing.

There was simply no allegation of such a breach and no

evidence presented with respect thereto.
In Garriffa v. Taylor, 675 P.2d 1284 (Wyo. 1984), the
Wyoming Supreme Court clearly set forth the law that for an express
warranty to arise, there must be more than a general statement that
seller is to provide a warranty. At Page 1286 of its opinion, the
Court stated as follows:
"In order for an express warranty to exist,
there must be some positive and unequivocal
statement concerning the thing sold which is
relied upon by the buyer and which is
understood to be an assertion concerning the
item sold and not an opinion."
The only express warranty provided by the Earnest Money
Sales Agreement is found in the pre-printed provisions on Page 1 of
the Agreement under Section C, Seller Warranties. In that section,

3
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seller warrants, inter alia that, "the plumbing, heating, air
conditioning

and

ventilating

systems,

electrical

system

and

appliances shall be sound or in satisfactory working condition at
closing-"

That is the extent of the express warranties with

respect to the construction of the home.

Otherwise, pursuant to

Section B of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, Plaintiffs accepted
the property in "as is" conditionIn order for Plaintiffs to recover under an express
warranty theory, they would have to present to the Court express
warranty language to the effect that seller was warranting against
any flooding of the home or was warranting against paint flaking
off the railings and decks on the exterior of the home or was
warranting against the pipes freezing and breaking in severe cold.
There is simply no evidence that such warranties were ever made a
part of the agreement between the parties.
At the hearing of July 31, 1992, wherein the Court set
forth its skeletal decision with respect to this matter, there was
absolutely no indication by the Court that any judgment was being
granted under an express warranty theory.

Recovery under such a

theory was not even argued in Plaintiffs1 closing argument.

The

Court on Page 9 of the Transcript of the hearing (a copy of which
is attached hereto as Exhibit "A") (hereinafter referred to as the
"Transcript"), in rendering its opinion that the defects found to
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exist did not render the home uninhabitable, stated that with
respect

to such

items, the parties can bargain

for express

warranties (Transcript, Page 7, lines 5 and 6). Even though the
evidence indicated the superior bargaining position of buyers with
respect to the purchase of the home, there was never any demand for
an express warranty regarding flooding, exterior paint or bursting
of pipes in severe cold spells.
The Court, on Page 10 of the Transcript, found that
Plaintiffs waived any claim of workmanship warranty, (Transcript,
Page 10, lines 10-12).

The waiver is found in Section B of the

General Provisions of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, Page 1,
which provides as follows:
B.
Inspection. Unless otherwise indicated,
Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said
property upon Buyer's own examination and
judgment
and
not
by
reason
of
any
representation made to Buyer by Seller or the
Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its
condition, size, location, present value,
future value, income herefrom or as to its
production, buyer accepts the property in "as
is" condition subject to Seller's warranties
as outlined in Section 6. In the event Buyer
desires any additional inspection, said
inspection shall be allowed by Seller but
arranged for and paid by Buyer.
The suggestion by Plaintiffs that they were awarded
damages under an express warranty theory is exactly opposite to the
Court's findings, conclusions and holding in this case. The Court
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specifically indicated on Page 20 of the Transcript that the only
reason the Court made the findings with respect to workmanship were
in the event the Court was reversed by the Court of Appeals saying
that the implied warranty of habitability was much more extensive
than this Court determined it to be (Transcript, Page 20, lines 710) •
There was simply no express assurance as to condition,
performance or physical quality and there was no express assurance
against defective work.

Paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs1

Proposed

Findings of Fact should be stricken.
2.

With respect to Paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs1 Proposed

Findings of Fact, the "Spring of 1988" is a misstatement of the
time that the Forsbergs moved into the subject home. Testimony was
that it was around Memorial Day which would put the move-in time at
the end of May, and beginning of June, 1988.

Defendant Spectrum

Development also objects to the phraseology, "the home leaked and
permitted substantial amounts of water to enter and to flood said
floor."

A more accurate statement in light of testimony would be

as follows:
6.
In May or June, 1988, water
discovered flowing onto and across
basement floor of the subject home.
3.

was
the

With respect to Paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs1 Proposed

Findings of Fact, Plaintiffs1 testimony with respect to the flaking
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paint was that there was some flaking in the spring or summer of
1988.

The only testimony regarding the repair required at that

time was by Randy Timothy who indicated that it would have cost him
approximately $200 in order to repair the flaking paint had a
request

been made

that

it be repaired

in

a timely manner.

Therefore, a more accurate factual statement would be as follows
with respect to Paragraph 7:
7.
During the Spring of 1988, Plaintiffs
noticed some flaking of the paint on the
railings and deck of the home.
4.

With respect to Paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs1 Proposed

Findings of Fact, the phrase "causing severe water damage to the
home" is an over-statement well beyond the testimony.

There was

not severe water damage to the home, but instead water damage in
two bathroom areas of the home.

A more accurate statement with

respect to Paragraph 8 would be as follows:
8.
During the night of February
certain water pipes within the home
burst causing water damage to two
areas of the home necessitating
worth of repair work.
5.

3, 1989,
froze and
bathroom
$5,169.92

With respect to Paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs1 Proposed

Findings of Facts, there is no indication in the Transcript even
hinting at such a finding and Defendant objects to its inclusion as
being unnecessary and a misstatement of actual findings. The Court
stated on Page 6 of the Transcript, " . . .

PLEADINGS\SPECTRUH.OBJ
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I cannot find by a

preponderance of the evidence that there was a failure to install
or select properly in a workmanlike fashion an adequate heating
plant."

(Transcript, Page 6, lines 13-15). This is the finding of

fact that should be set forth.
6.

With respect to Paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs' Proposed

Findings of Fact, Defendant Spectrum Development reiterates it
objections as set forth in Paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

Testimony

placed the discovery of the flooding in May or June of 1988 and
there was absolutely no finding by the Court that a failure to keep
the home water tight was covered by an express warranty.

The

Courtfs ruling was the opposite as set forth on Page 10 of the
Transcript, where the Court ruled as follows, "There was, however,
in this particular case, a waiver in the Earnest Money Sales
Agreement as to any claim of workmanship warranty."

(Transcript,

Page 10, lines 10-12.)
7.
unnecessary

With respect to Paragraph 16, this paragraph is
to

the

main

body

of

the

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law in that it was a supplementary finding only for
the purpose of preventing a retrial if the case is sent back down
by the Appeals Court due to adoption by them of a broader scope of
the implied warranty of habitability.

The statement "Plaintiffs

are entitled to those damages which are reasonably required to
repair and put the home in the condition as it should have been at
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8

the time of possession" is completely contrary to the Court's
decision which was not to award damages in light of the fact that
such flooding did not render the home uninhabitable,
8.
Findings

of

With respect to Paragraph 17 of Plaintiffs1 Proposed
Fact,

the

Court

never

found

that

the painting

deficiency was covered by an express warranty. The Court's ruling
was the opposite.

See Paragraph 6 above and Transcript, Page 10,

lines 10-12.
9.

With respect to Paragraph 18 of Plaintiffs' Proposed

Findings of Fact, there was absolutely no finding by the Court that
the cost to repair the defective painting was $3,049.

The only

testimony on the matter was that of Randy Timothy indicating that
he could have repaired the flaking paint for approximately $200.
There was no testimony from the individual who, three years
thereafter, did the painting for $3,049.

There was no testimony

that such costs were reasonable or necessary or that they in any
way related to or were a result of the initial flaking problem.
10.

With respect to Paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs' Proposed

Findings of Fact, the Court simply found that a lack of workmanlike
construction caused the pipes to burst and, but for the insurance,
the Plaintiffs would have suffered damages as reflected in Exhibits
P-46 - P-52, 57 - 62 and 6 6 - 7 0 , totaling $5,169.92, all of which
were reasonable in amount.
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(Transcript, Page 5, lines 19-23).

9

There was no finding of the Court with respect to an express
warranty since there was no express warranty given against pipes
freezing and bursting during severe cold periods.

See Paragraphs

1 and 6 above and Page 10 of the Transcript.
11.

With respect to Paragraph 22 of Plaintiffs1 Proposed

Findings of Fact, Plaintiffs' have here attempted to broaden the
mitigation findings beyond the scope of the Court's ruling.

The

Court found specifically that there was no failure on the part of
Plaintiffs to mitigate with respect to the flooding or with respect
to the pipes freezing and breaking. See Transcript, Page 5, lines
9-14 and Page 6, lines 2, 3.

The Court did not address the issue

of mitigation nor find it necessary to do so with respect to the
painting. The only testimony on point with respect to the painting
was that Plaintiffs never asked Randy Timothy to come back and
repair the flaking paint and that Randy Timothy was willing to come
back and repair the flaking paint had he been asked. Randy Timothy
was in the Plaintiffs' home after they moved in doing other work
for them, but they never asked him to repair the flaking paint on
the decks and handrails.
12.

With respect to Paragraph 24 of Plaintiffs' Proposed

Findings of Fact, there was no finding by the Court that Defendants
failed to install or select properly in a workmanlike fashion an
adequate heating system.
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The Court found just the opposite.

10

The

Court indicated that there was no evidence of any code violation•
The Court discredited the testimony of Sundloff and Thompson and
credited the testimony of Norton. Norton's testimony was that the
heating system installed by Neal• s Heating and Air Conditioning was
more than adequate to meet the purpose intended.

The Court found

that the Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof in showing
that

Defendants

failed

to

install

or

select

properly

in a

workmanlike fashion an adequate heating plant. Transcript, Page 6,
lines 4-20.
13.

With respect to Paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and

10 of

Plaintiffs1 Proposed Conclusions of Law (Page 8), there was no
finding by the Court of any express warranty against flooding or
against peeling paint or against frozen water pipes.

Defendant

reiterates the arguments set forth in Paragraph 1 above.
14.

With respect to Paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs' Proposed

Conclusions of Law (Page 9) , the Court did not rule that implied
warranties were waived by express warranties.

Rather, the Court

found a particular waiver in the Earnest Money Agreement as to any
claim of workmanship warranty.

The waiver is set forth in Section

B of the General Provisions of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement
which provides in part as follows:
"Buyer accepts the
condition . . . "

PLEADINGSXSPECTRUM.08J
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in

'as

is1

The Court simply found that Plaintiffs were subject to
the "as is" provision of Section B which is an express waiver of
any workmanship warranties.
15.

With respect to Paragraphs 21 and 22 of Plaintiffs1

Proposed Conclusions of Law (Page 10), there was absolutely no
finding that the flaking paint was a latent defect in the home.
The paint problems were addressed in the exhaustive punch list
created by Plaintiff Farrell Forsberg in anticipation of the
closing.

The only finding of the Court was set forth on Page 7 of

the Transcript where the Court stated,

"With respect to the

painting, I find that it was not done in a workmanlike fashion.
The failings, however, do not render the edifice uninhabitable."
Transcript, Page 7, lines 2-5.
In order to more accurately set forth the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Defendant is submitting concurrently
herewith its Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
DATED this

2*J

day of September, 1992.
MORGAN & HANSEN

/~)- -- *Jj...»

v
DerHTis R. James /*/
Attorney for Defgnaant Spectrum
Development
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 2*-f day of September, 1992,
I

caused

a

true

and

correct

copy

of

DEFENDANT

SPECTRUM

DEVELOPMENT'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS* PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid
to the following:
Harold A. Hintze
GARDINER & HINTZE
525 East 100 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

Duane R. Smith
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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Third Judicial District

NOV 2 * 1992
SALT LAKE COUNTY

By.

Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FARRELL G. and VICKI A.
FORSBERG,

MINUTE ENTRY
CIVIL NO.

900906667

Plaintiffs,
vs.
BURNINGHAM & KIMBALL, a Utah
general partnership, et al.,
Defendants.
SPECTRUM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a Utah corporation,
Third Party Plaintiff,
vs.
NEIL'S HEATING & AIR
CONDITIONING, a Utah corporation,
et al.,
Third Party Defendants.

Defendants'

objections

concerning

plaintiffs'

under the builder's warranty provision is sustained.
Dated this

z

f

day of November, 1992.

MICHAEL R. MURPHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

APPENDIX 6

recovery

FORSBERG V. BURNINGHAM & KIMBALL

PAGE TWO

MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Minute Entry,

to the following, this

day of November, 1992:

Duane R. Smith, Esq.
310 S. Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Harold A. Hintze, Esq.
525 East 100 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Dennis R. James, Esq.
136 S. Main, 8th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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